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Introduction
The world today, going into the twenty-first century is much "smaller" than the world in

1900. Most scholars. business leaders, and politicians would agree that we are all part of an

increasingly global community. The fax machine, telephone, and Internet allow for

instantaneous communication with people around the world. In addition, most professionals are

forced to come into contact with members of other cultures, whether it be for academic research

or commerce (Kauffman 1 ). This study arises out of the question, what implications does

globalization have for leaders, and how are leaders affected by extended experiences, such as
study abroad, in which they are exposed to another culture?

Researchers such as Piaget believe that a change in one's environment allows people to

perceive the world in a more complex manner. As individuals have new experiences which do
not mesh with their traditional framework for understanding the world, they must modify their
world view (Kauffman 124 ). Study abroad contributes to this change because students are

exposed to a new situation, and students are forced create a new social network different from

their established circles of family and friends. In addition, exposure to a new culture may lead
students to new ways of interpreting their own culture since foreign travel provides individuals
with a "unique opportunity to compare firsthand various forms of government, systems of

education, values and lifestyles" (Kauffman 69). This may lead to a critical examination of
one's own cultural assumptions, and could result in the incorporation of some of the host

country's cultural practices into one's own belief system.

The goal of this research is to determine whether extended study abroad and exposure to

a foreign culture has any impact on leadership. Specifically, the study is meant to investigate the
possibility of"bridge leaders," or leaders capable of integrating two discrete cultures and value

systems into a new type of leadership. I hope to explore whether extended exposure (at least one
year) to another culture and another socio-political context has an effect on a leader's political
and moral choices. In her book on global organizations, Nancy Adler speaks of reaching
"cultural synergy" in a multi-cultural situation. "Cultural synergy" would be an approach which
reflects the best aspects of all participant cultures without severely violating the cultural nonns
of any one of these individual cultures (Adler 1997 108). From this concept comes the idea of a
"bridge leader," who could create synergy by selecting aspects from both his native culture and
the culture in which he studied in order to find a unique leadership style effective in the
country's context. Or, one of these individuals could, perhaps, learn "bad values" from the
country of study and become an ineffective or morally corrupt leader.
In conjunction with the possibility of such "bridge leaders," the question of whether or
not foreign education provides the means for arriving at culturally creative solutions to problems
needs to be addressed. Does exposure to another culture expand one's value options? Or is the
effect of studying at a foreign educational institution minimal? Do leaders who have been
abroad have greater insight in solving ethnic conflicts? Or does time in another country simply
make an individual more nationalistic and devoted to his own cultural practices? Although this
paper does not have the opportunity to explore a1l of these questions in depth, it does look at the
careers of three international leaders who studied abroad in order to explore the possibility that
their experiences overseas affected decisions they made and political stances they took once they
attained leadership roles in their home countries.
The three political leaders examined in this paper each attended Harvard University in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, although their time at Harvard ranges from four months to four
years. Mary Robinson, who attended Harvard Law School, was president of the Republic of

Ireland; Benazir Bhutto, who graduated from Radcli�e College, was prime minister of Pakistan,
and Shimon Peres, who attended the Advanced Management Program of Harvard Business
School, was prime minister of Israel. While these cases barely scratch the surface of the

questions, a comparison of the three lives may grant some insight, not only into the influences

affecting the leadership of these individuals, but also into further questions regarding the impact

of foreign education on leadership and the connection between leadership, culture, family

background, and education.

Literature Review
In recent decades, education has increasingly been viewed as a tool for increasing

awareness and understanding of the "other" as well as for international development. R.

Freeman Butts states in 1963 that the "whole program of technical assistance itself is in essence
a matter of de1iberate education in social change and every such program of social change

involves the ideas, beliefs, customs, and education of the people involved, both senders and

receivers" (Butts 43). Despite this view, however, there are relatively few models in existence

for cross-cultural leadership, and for the effect of education on both the quality and effectiveness
of such leadership.

Geert Hofstede's study on the international relevance of American management theories

is one of most often-cited models for cross-cultural leadership, perhaps because it is one of the
few existing studies of any significance. Hofstede examines four variables: power distance,

uncertainty avoidance, individuality vs. collectivism, and masculinity vs. femininity (Hofstede

46). He then plots where different countries fall for each of these characteristics. Hofstede's
study, while it provides a basic foundation for understanding essential differences between

various nations' views on leadership, does not provide any real insight into the effect of cross
cultural education on leadership. Rather, Hofstede's focus is on the effectiveness of American
management and motivation theories in other countries, given these cu1tura11y different
perceptions of effective leadership. His study does, however, give a framework for comparing
and contrasting the stereotypical "cultural nonns" for leadership within Ireland, Pakistan, and
Israel, since each of these countries was included in Hofstede's study (See Appendix 1 ).
A more recent model for the effect of cross-cultural education presented by Nonnan
Kauffmann et al proposes a theoretical framework for studying the effect of study abroad on
students. They view education as change, and as a growth process which leads to a "complex
evolving process of balancing and rebalancing, of assimilating (interpreting new experiences in
tenns of current or previous structures of knowing) and accomodating (modifying existing ways
oflooking at the world to incorporate new knowledge or experience)" (Kauffmann 3).
Kauffinann's research model includes six variables- autonomy, belonging, values,
cognition/vocation, and worldview- which mediate the interaction between an individual and
the environment (Kauffman 127). (See Appendix 2)
The model represents a "pattern of development from adolescence to adulthood"
(Kauffmann 127), paying attention to both the cognitive and noncognitive aspects of personality.
According to the model, students move from Level I, in which they view the world in absolutist
tenns, relying on conventional values inherited from their families, to Level II, in which they
begin to question their assumptions and look at the world in more relativistic manner. Level III,
which most people do not reach until mid-life, represents a stage where "trust is centered in the
meeting of self and other, and in recognizing the strength in each" (Kauffinann 129). According
to the authors, studying abroad helps students gain a greater sense of autonomy and also

increases student• s tolerance and acceptance of other peoples' cultures and belief systems. A
foreign experience. therefore, helps students become more assured of their own beliefs in
relation to those of others and improves an individual's sense of autonomy. The level of
development depends, however, on the student's degree of autonomy before they study abroad as
well as on the degree of intensity and interaction while overseas.
Kauffmann states that empirical research does not adequately measure the changes
incurred by students during a study abroad experience. He argues that when students are
immersed in a foreign culture they cannot separate the personal from the academic. He states
that .. involvement in the new culture draws the students in, and it leads them to a way of
knowing that changes how they think and behave" (Kauffmann 143 ). This type of learning
intertwines the personal and the academic, resulting in a transfonnation which remains "hidden
to researchers using standardized instruments" (Kauffmann 143) to test the students'
development. According to Kauffmann, "study abroad represents a new way of knowing ... the
changes experienced by students who study abroad have eluded simple interpretation"
(Kauffmann 144 ). The authors continue on to say that "study abroad chal1enges educators and
researchers to discover new ways to explain and measure the process of change that is the
essence of education" (Kauffmann 145). In other words, studying abroad profound]y affects
individuals, albeit in different ways depending on the student's level of maturity and the degree
of immersion of their study abroad experience. Precisely because foreign education affects
one's personal and cognitive development, it is an extremely personal experience which affects
each individual differently. As a result, one cannot say with great assurance what effect studying
abroad would have on an individual's leadership until one investigated that individual's

developmental stage before their forei gn experience, and then analyzed the intensity of their time
in the host country.
Although F.G. Bailey does not comment directly on study abroad, he does write about
leaders' ability to choose between a variety of value systems when deciding how best to lead.
While study abroad is not the only way to gain exposure to other sets of cultural mores, it is one
means of doing so. Bailey's thesis is that "leadership is the art of exploiting cultures" (Bailey
46). By this, the author means that leaders have the ability to choose values and cultural
practices from among a variety of cultures, his or her options being limited only by the number
of cultures to which he or she has been exposed. According to this perspective, culture is not
king, for "1eaders make use of existing va1ues, either in a straightforward way or in more
devious ways, to recruit and control followers" (Bailey 58). Bailey's model of cross-cultural
leadership, therefore, is one in which leaders pick and choose the aspects of various value
systems which they would like to adopt, and discard the rest. As a result, moral codes lose their
original form, and instead become warped according to the goals and desires of the leaders.
Hofstede, Kauffmann, and Bailey present three completely different approaches to the
effect that exposure to a foreign culture has on leadership. Hofstede's model outlines the
possible modifications in behavior a leader might have to adopt when entering another country.
It does not call for any change in the leader's value system, or a change in the leader's
worldview, it merely cans for an understanding of the other country's cultural nonns according
to Hofstede's four variables, which may lead to a change in tactics on the part of the leaders.
Kauffinann's model is much less objective and concrete. He describes the study abroad process
as a learning experience in which an individual undergoes both personal and cognitive
development, which are so intertwined that it is difficult to measure the change which has

occurred within the individual. Kauffinann states that the individual who has studied abroad
begins to see and interact with the world in a different way. Bailey's approach is different still,
positing that leaders use their access to different cultural models for their own purposes of
exploiting their folJowers. Unlike Kauffmann's students, Bailey's leaders do not necessarily use
their exposure to foreign value systems as an opportunity for personal and cognitive
development

Methodology
This research seeks to find answers to the questions: Does education in another country
have an impact on individual leadership? How does exposure to a foreign culture affect a
leader's decision-making and moral choices? Do leaders educated abroad assume some of the
cultural practices of the country of education, or do they respond to situations and issues the
same way as others of their country? Do leaders with exposure to multiple cultures have the
ability to see multiple sides to issues when problem-solving? Because these questions are
looking for possible causal relationships, deal with contemporary subjects, and because the
leaders' individual behavior is impossible to control for, the research lends itself best to the case
study approach (Yin 16). In addition, since the subject of this paper revolves around personal
development and possible value-shifts, quantitative analysis would be difficult to conduct.
According to Robert Yin, "a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life con1ext; when the boundaries between
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are
used" (Yin 23). This project examines leaders holding a major political office within the last l O
years and studies whether their educational experience at Harvard seems to have any effect on

the decisions they make and on the morals they espouse. These individuals, therefore, are each

studied within the context of their own country, where their education is merely one variable

interacting with others such as world affairs, political system, family legacy, class system, social
movements, and role restrictions. Further, it utilizes several different sources of evidence,
including biographies, newspaper articles. journal articles, and archival documents.

Yin cautions that for multiple case studies, each case should be selected in such a way

that it either predicts similarities to the other cases or is expected to provide contrary results for a
predictable reason (Yin 53). I chose to study three individuals who have all studied at Harvard,

rather than at another foreign institution, in order to control for the culture and school to which
the leaders were exposed. Additionally, they are all leaders from countries which experience

ongoing historic religious or ethnic conflicts. Traditional research methods were used to select
and analyze the documents, which come from a wide range of sources, including speeches,

school archives, popular magazines, and scholarly works. Each source was examined with the

conscious realization that each document was written to a specific audience and for a specific
purpose (Yin 87).

Once data was collected, each case was organized in sections including personal

background, political career, and performance in their highest political office. Then, each case

was studied and analyzed separate from the others in order to see if foreign education seemed to

have an impact on that individual's leadership in relation to the other variables affecting their

life and their country. Specifically, the cases investigate how the leaders dealt with key issues
which might give insight into the leader's degree of openness to difference, skill at creative

problem-solving, level of initiative, and depth of global understanding. Afterwards, the results of

the cases were compared to see if there were any similarities, any trends for further study, or any

notable differences. In addition, the models presented by Hofstede, Kauffmann, and Bailey

were used as possible frameworks for gaining insight into the cases. The purpose of the paper is,
however exploratory, to investigate what, if any, impact foreign education has on leadership.

Much more must be researched however, including leaders from different schools, different

countries, and different contexts before one can make any definitive conclusions. 1f anything,

the findings of this paper should be used to raise additional questions regarding the impact of
study abroad on leadership and to lead to further investigation and definition of a "'bridge

leader." For this purpose, the data from the cases was also used to comment on the relevance of
the three models presented in the literature and to raise questions for further research.

MARY ROBINSON
Introduction/Overview
Although Independent, Mary Robinson was nominated by the Irish Labour Party as a

candidate for the 1990 presidential election. The Labour Party did not want Fianna Fail to have

the presidency again, and Mary Robinson fit all the necessary criteria: she was young, fit,

compassionate, and always sided with the underdog (O'Sullivan 176). A humanitarian idealist,

the odds against Mary Robinson winning the presidency were 100: 1 (Liswood 32). A key factor
in her electoral victory was the hard work of her campaign, in which she traveled around the

country, visiting community organizations and talking with the general public. The journey had

a profound effect on her leadership, as wel1, since Robinson claimed that "not since her Harvard

days had anything like it touched her life so completely" (O'Sullivan 182). Despite her efforts to
reach out to the voting public and her twenty years of experience as a Senator, Mary Robinson
won by a margin of merely 86,557 votes (McQuillan 7).

The position of Irish president is non-executive, and therefore has little real power
outside of the ability to intervene if proposed legislation is unconstitutional (Time 62). In fact,
she cannot give a speech or leave the country without permission from the prime minister
(Liswood 33). Despite her limited formal power, Mary Robinson created a position for herself,
with more than 800 engagements, 700 speeches, and 5 foreign visits within her first year. In
addition, Robinson began the policy of visiting all the counties in Ireland each year in order to
maintain a connection to the issues facing the Irish people. On these visits the president stressed
the importance of local and regional communities, encouraged people to express their own
creativity, identity and heritage, and advocated self-development through grassroots movements
(McQuillan 19). She created an office that is highly visible, not only by opening the presidential
mansion to any group ( including marginalized groups like homosexuals and the unemployed)
wanting to come (Time 62), but also by leaving a light on as a signal to Irish people abroad that
they have a tie to their homeland (Liswood 31 ).
Mary Robinson is a highly intelligent individual, and as such, she was determined to
achieve something with her presidency (Howell 245): Although as president she is
constitutionally forbidden to speak directly on political issues (Howell 244), Robinson outlined
specific goals which would characterize her tenn as head of state. One of these objectives was
the desire to represent those of Irish descent living outside of the Emerald Isle and has suggested
the use of the Internet for Irish around the world to keep in touch with each other and their Irish
heritage (Knight l ). Connected to this goal, the president hoped to deepen her own knowledge
of the Irish language and cultures while also promoting local community development projects
in the hopes that others would follow her example. On a larger scale. Robinson was concerned
with extending friendships, with no strings attached, to both communities in Northern Ireland.

She also demonstrated concern for the international protection of human rights, making visits to

famine-stricken Somalia and pleading on their behalf before the United Nations (Carroll 1 ).

Personal Background
Mary Robinson comes from a distinguished, conservative, prosperous. professional

family. Growing up in Western Ireland, Mary Robinson (nee Bourke), saw little of the poverty
experienced by her neighbors(O'Sullivan 14). She attended Miss Claire Ruddy's private

preparatory school in Ballina, until age 10, when she left for boarding school in Dublin under the
care of nuns of the Society of the Sacred Heart (O'SulHvan 19). In 1961 Mary Robinson

attended a Paris finishing school where she gained fluency in French, as well as an appreciation
for French culture, before enrolling at Trinity College, Dublin. Trinity College was

conservative by European standards, and had not experienced the student revolts of American

and other European universities. While in college, Robinson was described as a ..bluestocking,"
who was opposed to any organizations that sounded like they might be liberal or progressive
(O'Sullivan 26).

It was not until she arrived at Harvard University Law School in 1967 on a scholarship

that any sign is seen of the liberal advocate of international human rights. women's equality, and
social justice. Harvard was in the middle of a student revolution. with a student body intensely

involved in public affairs. The university was facing up to the inequalities of sex and race at a

Duffy when all of the United States was beginning to question its social values. Law students

were especially concerned with their social responsibility in regard to community problems, and

the moral basis of the laws they studied. They questioned authority, institution� and competitive
systems (Dean's Statement 3).

For Robinson, Harvard was a "seismic learning experience," an environment of intense
questioning that encouraged her to think for the first time. The teaching method at Harvard was
different than that of Trinity College. At Harvard, professors emphasized discussion, and forced
students to examine the unresolved ambiguities of the law (Duffy 64 ). The Law School
Handbook for 1967-68 emphasized the school's case method approach and the professor's use of
the Socratic method to draw answers out of the students (Handbook 15). Professors at Harvard
Law School were not in the business of telling students what was and what was not correct.
Rather, students were responsible for thinking, and professors asked questions intended to
trouble students (Handbook 20). The purpose of class was not to make students memorize the
law, but rather to "analyze a complex: of facts that is a description of relationships of members
within society" (Handbook 10).
Robinson often acknowledges a debt to Harvard, stating that the young people there were
more prepared to accept responsibility and seek involvement after graduation. One of the central
missions of the Law School, clearly stated in its handbook, was the lawyer's obligation for
public service, whether in private practice or public service (Handbook 7). The handbook also
mentions the lawyers "role as an advocate" (Handbook 77) and the role of "guardian of due
process and the integrity of the government process" (Handbook 84). Several other key
objectives outlined in the handbook included the importance of striving for equality before the
law (Handbook 85), the need to represent causes that may be unpopular (Handbook 87), and the
role of the lawyer in legal refonn (Handbook 88). Most importantly, perhaps. Harvard Law
School hoped to train the type oflawyer who would remain "free to make up his own mind how
he will vote, what causes he will support, what economic and political philosophy he will
espouse" (Handbook 89). After an intense year of study, Robinson began to apply what she had

n

seen at Harvard to the situation in Ireland. She returned home "transformed by her experience
in the United States, a ··bluestocking" converted to liberalism who was determined to use the law
to improve society (O'Su11ivan 31).

Legislative Background
The political life of Mary Robinson began long before the 1990 presidential election,
however. Her true legislative impact occurred during her 20 years in the Senate (Duffy 64),
when she distinguished herself as an independent thinker and as a vocal advocate for the
oppressed. When Mary Robinson (Mary Bourke at the time) was elected in 1969, she was one of
five women in the Senate (O'Sullivan 41). People were attracted by her energy and vigor, and
Robinson, elected on an independent platform, was consistently re-elected to the Trinity seat.
From the outset, Robinson was critical of the Senate for failing to exert any real influence on the
political life of Ireland, and she worked to change it by bringing issues of social welfare to the
Senate floor.
Within six months of her first election, Robinson was unpopular with the Roman
Catholic hierarchy, the middle-class, and the conservatives. She had a fundamental belief in the
rights of the individual, which enabled her to see beyond the usual class distinctions (McQuillan
73 ). She was also able to see beyond religious lines as evidenced by her December 1970
marriage to Nicholas Robinson, a Protestant (O'Sullivan 49) and her argument for a secular,
rather than a Catholic constitution in order to better reflect Ireland's pluralism (O'Sullivan 73).
Throughout her career she scrutinized legislation� spoke out on minority issues, advocate needed
reforms, and drew attention to injustices (O'Sullivan 113). At times her advocacy for the
disadvantaged resulted in her suspension from the Senate; once for protesting a case of gender

discrimination in the workplace and once when prisoners were placed in military custody
(O'Sullivan 121).
In 1977 Mary Robinson joined the Labour Party out of a desire to change the structures
of wealth and power and fonn a more s_ocialist, democratic society founded on principles of
equality (O'Sullivan 95). The independent-minded senator left the party in 1985, however, due
to her disapproval of the Anglo-Irish agreement, which she perceived as an imposed framework
since the Unionist parties were not involved in the negotiations (O'Sullivan 152).
One of Robinson's passions was to be an advocate for women's issues, although she
claimed to be against the "extremist" American feminist movement which challenged the social
order (O'Sullivan 42). Contraception was one of the main issues she worked to address. The
Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1935 prohibited the import of contraceptives for sale, although
Doctors could prescribe "cycle regulators" for their patients, and thousands of women were
taking the pill for .. medical reasons" (O'Sullivan 53).
Despite national sentiment supporting legalized contraception, however, when Robinson
presented the first Contraception Bill to the Dail (Spillane 3), she could not even get a first
reading. In 1973 she created a modified version of the bill which moved contraception from
being an issue of criminal law to one of welfare (O'Sullivan 61 ). This bill was read, and even
made it to the second stage, but it, too was defeated. Mary Robinson refused to accept defeat,
however. She reminded the House in 1977 that contraceptives remained banned, and in 1978 she
introduced a Family Planning Bill which was later blocked (O'Sullivan 122). After deciding not
to run for reelection in 1989, Mary Robinson joined the Law Library and became one of a
handful of practicing female barristers in Ireland (O'Sullivan 170). She fought in Irish and
European Courts for the reform of laws which restrict the availability ofinfonnation regarding

abortion, that make homosexual acts guilty of life imprisonment, and that label children born out
of wedlock "illegitimate" ("Presidential Lies" 59).

Presidency
Robinson, as president, engaged with communities all over Ireland, emphasizing

overlapping concerns and aspirations that described the general human experience more than

national. religious, or socioeconomic differences. Three areas in which Robinson demonstrated
particularly influential leadership are women's rights, the Northern Ireland issue, and
international human rights.

Women's Rights
Mary Robinson's election was seen as a "seismic paradigm shift" in a country whose

constitution defines women's position in society in relation to the home (Spillane 2).0nce

elected president, Robinson continued her social advocacy and used her position as a platfonn
for endorsing and validating women's groups al1 over Ireland (McQuillan 41 ). KnoMJ for her

often liberal views, Robinson "has gone out of her way to embrace traditional women's groups

as well as feminists, clearly conscious that she can play her role as a national symbol only if she

avoids alienating more conservative members of society" (Phillips 46). She invited women,
Protestant and Catholic, from Belfast to come tell their stories from Northern Ireland with

women in the Republic of Ireland. She offered the women the resources of her office to help

them establish a network of women's groups and to put them in touch with groups throughout
Europe (Mccafferty 19).

When asked whether she saw herself as a role model for other women, Robinson
answered that she was ..vety pleased that I seem to be giving a boost and a support to women in
sort of every walk of life, and I mean not only what might be characterized as more traditional
rural women, even older traditional rural women, but also young feminists, and women of all
backgrounds·• (CarroU 16). She was, indeed, successful at using her role as the first female
president to advocate women's issues. In fact, she was successful that all four candidates
running in the presidential elections in October, 1997 were women (Bogert 45).
Robinson credited Irish women for her electoral victory, and in her victory speech she
thanked all the women "who instead of rocking the cradle rocked the system" with their vote
(Spillane 12). While a legislator and practicing lawyer, Robinson developed the legal
underpinnings for divorce and abortion-rights reform, although she personally does not believe
in abortion. In 1996, during her presidency, heland held a referendum which legalized divorce.
Although abortion has still not been legalized, reforms have allowed the display of information
showing how to go to Britain for the procedure (Spillane 13).

Northern Ireland
Robinson's approach to the Northern Ireland situation is another critical example of her
ability to bridge cultures and identities. More recently, Robinson became the first Irish president
to make Northern Ireland a primary concern, and was the first welcome Protestants and
Catholics from Belfast to the presidential mansion. In 1992 she met with women's groups in
Belfast. and in 1993 the president caused a furor by shaking hands with Gerry Adams. president
of Sinn Fein (McQuiUan 51 ). At the time, Adam's was not only denied a U.S. visa. but was also

banned from British television (Spillane 15). The gesture's intent, however, was not to stir
controversy, but rather to ease '"the isolation of Catholic-dominated West Belfast" (Knight 24).
Robinson's "path to indusionary politics has often been at some distance from the main
road" (Spillane 14). Yet her handshake with Gerry Adams led to imitation, by then-Prime
Minister Albert Reynolds and by Bill Clinton (Spillane 15). She has worked to create
opportunities for dialogue among various community and women's groups in Northern Ireland,
and has invited mixed groups of Catholics, Presbyterians, Methodists, and Anglicans to Dublin
in order to promote positive press regarding Northern Ireland. In addition, the president was the
first to make an official visit to Northern lreland, and has actually visited four times. Those
visits have included laying flowers on the monument to 11 victims killed by an Irish Republican
Army bomb blast in 1987, an open rebuke of the IRA, which many Irish politicians have
hesitated to condemn (Phillips 47). On the home front, Robinson worked to prevent the Dublin
government from institutionalizing its position in the North. By maintaining distance, Robinson
feels the Republic oflreland can better free the parties within Northern Ireland to arrive at a
mutua11y acceptable form of government (O'Sullivan 155).

International Human Rights
Robinson's presidency was marked by her attention to international human rights issues,
particularly the famine in Somalia. She broke all precedent by being the first head of state to
visit Somalia and refugee camps in Kenya in 1992 and then argued on the victim's behalf in
front of the United Nations General Assembly (Carroll 14). While in the country, Robinson
hand-fed starving children, and she accused the United Nations and the European Community of
"'offending justice by acting slowly in aiding the devastated people of Somalia "' (Phillips 46).

Robinson's plea in front of the United Nations sparked the organization ••for the first time in its
history to intervene in a member nations internal affairs for humanitarian reasons" (Spillane 15).
Robinson's compassion for developing countries was not isolated to Somalia. In 1994
Robinson visited the enonnous refugee settlements in Tanzania and Zaire resulting from the
Rwandan civil war (Spillane 15). In her current position as United Nations high commissioner
for human rights, Robinson has spoken with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and
Congolese President Laurent Kabila about their respective countries' abuse of human rights
(Bogert 45). When discussing her compassion for the African famine victims or her
understanding of developing countries, Robinson shared that"[w]e have a folk memory of
famine in Ireland. We were never a colonizing country. We were for a long period of our
history a colony, and so we have that remembered history. We have a very strong folk memory
of the pot.ato famine in Ireland in the 1840s" (Carron 14). In addition, she emphasized that ..by
my history, rm from the south [the po1itically correct tenn for poor countries]. That does mean
I have a broader perspective" (Bogert 45).

Analysis
As president, Mary Robinson "took a dull. ceremonial job and used it as a soapbox to
advocate civil rights" (Bogert 45). Her leadership in the areas women's issues, the situation in
Northern Ireland, and international human rights demonstrate her ability to "defy convention,
create precedents and think for herself' (Knight 24). The president was described as "liberal and
feminist in Irish tenns" (Knight 24), which implies that the president takes the context of the
country and her followers into consideration when acting out her beliefs. In fact, Robinson has
been hailed for engaging with many communities across Ireland, working to touch common

hopes and concerns in order to create a broader bond of humanity that transcends ideological and
geographical boundaries (Spillane 15).
Robinson's approach to international human rights demonstrates her desire to work in the
global arena while maintaining an Irish identity. Robinson sought to bridge the difference
between Ireland and developing countries in Africa by capitalizing on the history of the Irish
potato famine, as we11 as Ireland's own colonial history under Great Britain. Although Robinson
recognized the difficulties of developing nations, and worked to draw attention to the plight of
the suffering in China or the Congo.
Although merely a figurehead in the role of the president (Knight 24), Robinson
'"embodie[d) a new pride in being Irish-and [broke] the old nationalist mould in which Irish
politics have long been set" Rather than engaging in the political scandal which previously
characterized Irish government, Robinson engaged in fighting for controversial social issues.
Perhaps this is why she has been perceived as practicing a "special brand of moral leadership"
(Phillips 4 7). Robinson has also been described as one "wil1ing to defy expectations" and one
who "turned an irrelevant, constitutional necessity into a vibrant and exciting institution that
plays to the strengths of a modem Ireland (Ryan 22).
A quick look at the accomplishments of Mary Robinson explains from where the praise
originates. Active both at home and in the international arena, Robinson's popularity in Ireland
stood at 93% in 1995. Not only did she make over 63 official and state visits during her tenure
in office, but, closer to home, she also ventured to Belfast where she shook hands with Sinn
Fein leader Gerry Adams. In addition, Robinson highlighted human rights issues abroad, as in
Somalia, and in Ireland, with groups including the homosexuals, unwed mothers, and the
impoverished. Robinson also speaks in interviews of a "new global ethic" in which "divisions

on moral issues such as divorce mark differences as much as views on society or the
economy....[ and] which values community endeavor more than statist bureaucracy" (Ryan 21 ).
It is difficult to determine how much, if any, Mary Robinson's year at Harvard Law
School influenced her leadership, whether in the Irish legislature, court systems, or presidency.
She did definitely exert her independence and her desire to be a free-thinker while in the
legislature, maintaining Independent status for the majority of her career, and separating from
the Labour Party when she disagreed with their stance on certain issues. This independence,
questioning of policy, and hesitancy to accept any dictated platform could possibly stem from
her experience at Harvard, since the classroom was characterized by the Socratic method and an
atmosphere of debate and distrust of institutional dictates. Likewise, it could simply be a genetic
trait, or a habit of self-preservation she developed from being the single girl in a household full
of boys.
Robinson's activism and concern for the oppressed could also very well stem from her
year in the United States, since Harvard in 1968 was intensely involved in the civil rights
movement, the feminist movement, and the anti-war protest. The student body was active in
demonstrations, rallies, and in the formation of committees to promote community involvement
and service to the city of Boston. The Law School sought to ingrain in their students a sense of
moral responsibility and an obligation to serve society through their skills. Trinity College in
Dublin did not have this same type of educational philosophy, so for the middle-class, sheltered
Robinson, Harvard represented an entirely new perspective on the world.
Robinson's leadership was characterized by a willingness to listen to and accept varying
points of view on controversial issues. Despite her own personal opposition for abortion, for
example, Robinson fought to loosen the restrictions on the availability of information regarding

the procedure. In addition. she worked to support a wide range of women's groups, from

traditional. stay-at-home mothers, to radical feminist liberation organizations in the hope that she

would not alienate any women, but rather validate the diverse roles women played in Irish

society. Robinson also sought out diverse views on the Northern Ireland issue, and invited
individuals of all religions to Ireland to share their perspectives both with citizens of the

Republic oflreland, and to share their views with others from Northern Ireland in a non
confrontational surrounding.

While there is nothing concrete to point to in Mary Robinson's leadership to say

definitively whether or not she was a "bridge leader," Robinson does demonstrate a leadership
characterized by openness and acceptance to difference. Her willingness to hear differing

perspectives does not imply that she does not have her own moral standards; rather, Robinson

has high moral standards, especially in regards to human rights, but she is willing to listen to and
process other people's opinions on issues before she takes action. Likewise, she seeks to work
with co11aborative groups and to encourage community grass-roots organizations to give more
people the opportunity to express their own views and opinions. Robinson is not an extreme
relativist. nor is she by any means an absolutist when it comes to cultural or moral issues.

Rather, Robinson seeks a balance between her own personal moral code, and the ethic of

Ireland, the European Community, and the larger international community. ln this regard,
Robinson is a bridge leader.

BENAZIR BHlITTO
Personal Background
Benazir "Pinkie" Bhutto was born June 21, 1953 into a wealthy, upper-class family
which had been politica11y active for generations. While her rosy skin gave her the name
"Pinkie" (Chitkara 21). a long family history as large landholders (Bhutto 38), and a long history
in politics, stood behind the name Bhutto. The Bhutto family is to Pakistan what the Kennedy
family is to the United States, and the young Benazir was "raised in a Karachi mansion by a
British nanny, dressed in clothes from Saks" ("Benazir� face-to-face" 59). From the time of her
birth, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made a deliberate attempt to groom Benazir for political leadership,
and sought to give her a sense of her nation's history. As children, Benazir and her siblings were
exposed to high•level diplomatic meetings, since Zulfikar often brought them to meet foreign
delegations visiting Pakistan (Bhutto 49). At the same time, however, Z.A. Bhutto wanted his
daughter to have a Western education (Shafqat 1996 657). Benazir and her brother went to
Catholic boarding school at an ear1y age, and at age 16 she was accepted to Radcliffe College
(Bhutto 42).
Benazir Bhutto arrived at Harvard in 1969 as a "pampered daughter of privilege." Up to
that time she "had never cooked a meal, washed a blouse, walked more than a block without
being picked up by a chauffeur, or lifted a ringing telephone" ("Benazir; face-to-face'' 59). She
was shocked by coed bathrooms, smoking, and the informal nature of students in the classroom.
She was very active in a wide variety of activities, hung out with the football and soccer pl ayers,
but lived in Eliot House, known for its aristocratic ambiance. According to the senior tutor at
Eliot House, "Bhutto threw herself enthusiastically into this bubbling mixture of backgrounds
and social change, cultivating a democratic style and never putting on airs" (Starr 418).

Bhutto exhibited an interest in the United States and its regional differences, and even
traveled to Mississippi over one spring break. Although she fit in with her college classmates,
friends say she "a]ways had a special way of combining her heritage and the West" (Starr 456).
One classmate recalled that Bhutto did "not have a lover-her friends [understood] that for an
upper-class Muslim woman that is out of the question-but she hangs out with a boisterous
crowd of baseball jocks and teases them in the dining hall about their love lives" ("Benazir; face
to-face" 60). Another remembered "Pinkie-playing squash in.sweatpants so as to observe
Islamic modesty" (Starr 418) or "blending Islamic attire with Western chic. Islam call[ed] for
her to wear pants, for example, so she [wore} ultra-tapered slacks and an oversized sweater.
Custom call[ed] for her to drape her head in a scarf, but it's an Hermes" (Starr 456).
Despite her modest inroads into Western culture, "Pinkie" never forgot that she was the
daughter of the prime minister or an Islamic woman. Those who knew her at the time say that
she had an American "college kid side," but once political debates began, her role switched
immediately to Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistani of a certain class, history, and political
environment (Starr 419). One classmate accompanied Bhutto to a dinner of the Boston-area
Pakistani Students Association. She recalled, ..The minute Pinkie stepped into her Pakistani
dress she became reserved, almost regal. At the dinner, I noticed the deference with which she
was treated by the hosts and the other Pakistani students. She accepted it easi1y. I knew right
then that she wouldn't be Pinkie forever" (Starr 456).
Perhaps part of the reason for Bhutto's strong attachment to her Pakistani identity were
the major events which occurred in Pakistan while she was away studying. In 1970, her
sophomore year, elections were held for the first time in 13 years, and the Pakistan People's
Party (PPP) under leadership of Z.A. Bhutto gained contro1 in West Pakistan. East Pakistan,

however, desired independence from the West, and proceeded to revolt. In 1971, when the
Pakistani army slaughtered thousands of Bangladeshis, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took over as
president. Although Harvard condemned Pakistan's actions, Benazir ""defend[edJ her father
ferociously," and when professor Michael Walzer criticized Pakistan's military policies in class,
she stood up "and lectur[ed] the lecturer in a voice shaking with anger" ("Benazir; face-to-face"
60). Over the next few years Bhutto became "vehemently nationalistic," and her senior thesis
was entitled '"Muslim Separation and the Origins of Pakistan" ("Benazir; face-to-face'' 60).
When reflecting back on her Harvard experience, however, Bhutto said it helped shape
her understanding of politics and governmental process. She marched with Harvard students in
anti-Vietnam rallies both in Boston and in Washington, D.C. Although she was already against
the participation of the United States in an Asian civil war, Bhutto claims she was more
radicalized by the anti-war furor surrounding her (Bhutto 59). She learned her first lessons in
democracy at Harvard, and it became difficult to reconcile the contradiction between the ideal
presented before her in her education and the autocratic reality of Pakistan (Shafqat 1996 657).
She herself writes that she learned the importance of legitimate government, adding that "by
studying government at Harvard I began to understand more about Pakistan than I ever had by
living there" (Bhutto 61).
Benazir applied this knowledge to the political situation which was unfolding at home in
Pakistan. When Z.A. Bhutto met with Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi at the Simla summit
in June, 1972, his daughter, a junior in college, accompanied him (Bhutto 69). In 1973, her
senior year, Pakistan created its first democratic Constitution and her father was elected prime
minister. In her book, Bhutto connects the Pakistani Constitution to her Harvard experience,
saying "the first representative government of Pakistan finally had the legal framework to

govern, the sanctioned authority that Professor Womack had brought home to me so c1early in
his seminar" (Bhutto 76). The Watergate hearings were simultaneously occurring in the United
States, and Benazir recalls that Watergate taught her the importance of nationally accepted laws
which apply to all members of society, from peasant to president. She was amazed that '"even a
powerful president like Richard Nixon, who had put an end to the Vietnam War and opened the
path way to China, could not escape the law of his land. I had read Locke, Rousseau, and John
Stuart Mill on the nature of society and the state, the need to guarantee the rights of the people.
But theory was one thing. Seeing it unfold in practice was quite another" (Bhutto 76).
After her four years at Harvard, Benazir moved on to study at Oxford. There, she was
surrounded by people of her own elite social class, and submerged in a much more formal
educational system than that of Harvard (Starr 457). She joined the Oxford Debating Union, and
in 1976 became the first female president of this "old boy's club" at a time when the male to
female membership ratio was 7: 1 (Bhutto 85). Even though Bhutto claims that while she was at
Oxford Pakistan seemed very far away, she retained close connections to home, much as she did
while at Harvard, and she also claims that she never considered not returning to Pakistan, for in
Pakistan lies her heart, heritage, and culture (Bhutto 84).

Pakistani Context
In order to more fairly evaluate Benazir Bhutto's leadership, one must consider the
political context of Pakistan, for its political culture is quite different from that of the United
States, Ireland, or Israel. Pakistan is a country trying to establish a stable political system in a
nation long dominated by bureaucratic military elites. These military officials control
institutional bases of power, monopolizing government resources, and therefore possess a great

deal of power, privilege, and status within the country (Shafqat 1997 4). The only other
Pakistani class that can begin to rival the power and prestige of the military elite is that of the
feudal landlords, the class to which the Bhuttos of Sindh belong. The landowners, however, are
not a homogenous group, and do not share either a political ideology, ethnicity, or perspective of
Pakistan. Instead, they are defined solely by their relationship to those who cultivate their lands,
a relationship based on dominance and control (Shafqat 1997 5).
Pakistan has only been an independent country since 1947. It is, therefore, a relatively
new country, with a long history of dominance by outside forces. The country has little
experience with democracy, and therefore, the politicians are sti11 learning the necessary skills of
negotiation, bargaining, and consensus-building. The process of democratization has been
hindered further by the manipulation of the military elite, who purposefu11y seek to undercut the
political process, thereby consolidating their own power. In the l 990s, therefore, political
leaders continue to seek dominance within their own party, working to expand their own power
as elected officials rather than work with other political parties to establish democratic structures
(Shafqat 1997 13).
General Zia remained in power from 1977 until I 988, the longest rule by any one
individual in Pakistan's history. Altho�h he tried to have elections a couple times in the first
years of his reign, they were canceled both times when Zia saw an "acceptable government" of
pro-Islam and pro-military candidates was not likely to be elected. Under Zia, Pakistan
experienced a period of harsh military rule, with Islamic reforms, constitutional changes, and a
restriction of democracy (Richter 433). In 1983, Zia announced a program to gradually restore
democracy, and in1985 he held the first national elections since the 1977 coup which ousted
Z.A. Bhutto. Political parties remained banned, however, so the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)

and other anti-Zia groups boycotted. Despite the boycott, candidates associated with the PPP

performed wel1 in the election, resulting in PPP being the strongest party to emerge despite eight

years of being banned (Bhutto 279). General Zia lifted martial law December 30, 1985, and
soon after political parties were allowed (Richter 434).

The long rule of the military strongly impacted Pakistan's political system. When Benazir

Bhutto and the PPP were elected into office in 1988, an entire generation of military officers had
been indoctrinated against the PPP during their eleven years of service under Zia (Shafqat 1997
228). In order to build a ruling coalition, Bhutto had to make a series of agreements with the

president, which included staying out of military affairs, and not interfering with the broad thrust

of foreign policy, also the domain of the military (Richter 436). Bhutto also kept some of the

military-minded leaders appointed by Zia, including the foreign minister, the Chief of Army
Staff(COAS), and the president (Shafqat 1997 227).

Despite these concessions, the coalition remained precarious, with the president wary of

Bhutto's intentions, and the military bureaucracy resentful of their PPP bosses (Richter 435).

The uneasy partnership increased the challenge of running a democratic country, and four major
conflicts between Bhutto and the military bureaucracy contributed to the dismissal of her

government in August 1990, on charges of corruption, inefficiency, and misconduct of power

(Shafqat 1997 230-1). On October 19, 1993 Benazir Bhutto was elected to a second term as a
prime minister, the first woman in the Muslim world to gain a second term in the position

(Chitkara 73). In her second term, She avoided interference in military affairs, and protected

the interests of the military by campaigning to get arms from foreign sources (Shafqat 1996 667).
Perhaps partly because of her improved relationship with the military, Bhutto's second
government lasted three years.

Political Background
Bhutto's transition into Pakistani society from her time at school was not smooth. She

left Oxford on June 25, 1977, and on July 5 a military coup led by General Zia resulted in the
army's control of Pakistan (Bhutto 101). The years that followed for Bhutto included house
arrest, detention, imprisonment, and her father's 1979 execution. In 1981 the Movement to
Restore Democracy began in the Bhutto house, as a protest against Zia's military rule and

martial law. The military responded to the group by arresting members and putting Bhutto in

solitary confinement for five months (Bhutto 182). When Bhutto was released from prison in

1983 she left for London, the center of political activity for PPP members in exile (Bhutto 259).

While in exile, Bhutto actively worked to raise awareness of Pakistan's situation, by publishing

an Urdu magazine for distribution to international organizations and embassies, and by traveling
to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to ask for assistance (Bhutto 263). She did

not return to her country until July, 1985, when her brother Shah Nawaz died of poisoning, and
she flew the body back to Pakistan for burial (Bhutto 300). That December Zia lifted martial

law, and in January, 1986, Benazir asked the PPP Central Executive Committee if they would
approve her return to Pakistan (Bhutto 318).

Upon return, Bhutto spent time traveling around the country, giving speeches,

participating in demonstrations, and working to strengthen the PPP. In December, 1987 she
married Arif Zardari, a businessman, in an arranged union, thereby satisfying those who

disapproved of a single woman's involvement in politics. In May, 1988 Zia dismissed the Junejo

government and set November 16 as the date for elections, guessing at the time when the

pregnant Bhutto would be giving birth and therefore be at a disadvantage (Richter 434). Before

they occurred, however, Zia was ki11ed in a plane crash. Benazir began campaigning, promising
to fight the culture of crime and corruption in government. She promised to provide a better life
for peasants and to end ethnic strife (Chitkara 14). Benazir was able to mobilize PPP
supporters, and her reputation as a confrontational resistance leader and crusader for democracy
helped the PPP win the elections, as did her family name. Going into her first term, however,
there were questions regarding her ability to make the transition to a parliamentary leader and
consensus builder (Shafqat 1997 226). Topics that help analyze Benazir Bhutto's ability to
bridge her experiences at Harvard with her leadership in Pakistan include her stance on social
issues, the foreign policy with India, governmental corruption, and Pakistani ties to the United
States.

Prime Minister
Social and Economic Issues
Bhutto's record in regard to women's issues, social welfare, and ethnic relations not lived
up to expectations. To foreign officials, Bhutto portrayed herself as a "woman struggling against
the odds to steer her turbulent Islamic country on a moderate course of economic liberalization
and social justice .... but economic and security problems-notably a long-running conflict with
the ethnic Mohajir National Movement in Karachi -dented her popularity at home" (Lyon 4 ).
When running for office, Bhutto's platform included plans for "slum clearance, food for the
hungry and land and jobs for the peasants" (Doan 11 ). Bhutto also tapped into her gender,
claiming that support for her government was "an act of solidarity with international
womanhood, " and presented herself in a speech as ..a representative of the young ... As a
representative of women" (Beinart 12).

Despite Benazir's campaign promises to remove the Shariah laws (Islamic religious law)
as well as the Hudood ordinances, which requires four witnesses to prosecute a rape if a woman
is to escape charges of fornication or adultery, both of which are punishable by stoning and
flogging (Liswood 152), Pakistan's Human Rights Commission "described her support for
women's rights as 'lip service

"'

(Beinart 12). Although Bhutto did order the release of the

women charged under the Hudood ordinances, she did not follow through with the
implementation, and she did not act to repeal the Shari ah from fear of the mu11ahs ( powerful
Islamic religious officials) (Rafi. 18). Although the PPP had enough votes to repeal the
ordinance, Bhutto felt her "hands were tied" because oflslamic passions (MacFarquhar 1989
39). Bhutto did take some administrative measures to promote women's rights, such as elevating
the Women's Division (which pursues socio-economic progress for women) to the ministerial
level (Rafi 19) and appointing three women to prominent positions in government (Shafqat 1996
658). In addition, her cabinet during her first term included five women out of 43 members
(Shafqat 1997 227), which is not too bad, considering that Bhutto was the first fema]e prime
minister of any modern Muslim nation (Richter 433 ). OveraJl, however, Bhutto disappointed
Pakistan• s women activists, who were "looking to their first woman Prime Minister to erase
centuries of discrimination" (MacFarquhar 1989 39).
Bhutto also disappointed the poor, who ••form the PPP's main constituency" ('"Hard Part"
47). Despite a national per capita income which placed Pakistan on the border of becoming a
middle-class nation, the literacy rate was merely 24%, life expectancy only 52 years, infant
mortality was 10% of all births, and maternal mortality was 600 out of 100,000 births
(MacFarquhar 1989 39). In many ways, however, Bhutto was set up to fail, for the poor's
perspective was "we've been denied everything for the past eleven years. Now it's our tum to

get a share" ( ..Hard Part" 4 7). Despite these hopes. the treasury was practicaHy empty under
Bhutto's leadership. She has been criticized for failing to move quickly enough on economic
and social legislation (Richter 449), and the PPP focused more on the politics of patronage than
economic policy (Shafqat 1997 234). Although Bhutto did take "all the cost-free measures at
her command" in her first few days in office. freeing political prisoners, ending censorship of the
press, and lifting a ban on student unions, "four months into its term, the PPP [had] not
introduced a single piece oflegislation" (MacFarquhar 1989 39).
Granted. the IMF had struck an unfavorable deal with Zia, which Bhutto was forced to
continue which contnbuted to the financial woes of Pakistan. Military spending and debt
setvicing together account for over 80% of the budget. In contrast to the 52.2 billion rupee
military budget, education received only 1.97 billion rupees. Despite IMF insistence on a
reduction in the budget deficit, the government made little effort to control government
spending. Wealth was not spent productively. and "the governmenes high rate of domestic
borrowing starves industry of money for investment" ("Getting Away" 36). In addition, tax
evasion was rampant, and only 1% of the country's 130 miJlion people actua11y paid income
taxes (Shafqat 1997 248). Those taxes which were paid were raised largely through a new sales
tax that "hit the ordinary people hardesf'('Tax and Bend" 34). The public fe]t the new tax
increases were "levied unfairly, with the privileged and the well-connected exempted." This
complaint was well founded, since the elite landowner's agricultural income was tax exempt,
civil servants retained previous tax breaks, and members of parliament voted themselves pay
raise as part of the new budget ("Tax and Bend" 34). All in all, the budget reinforced the
sentiment of the young and poor who "feel alienated from a government that seems to be owned
by the rich" ('"Pakistan" 4).

One final group noticeab1y upset with Bhutto's failure to live up to campaign promises
was the MQM (United Refugees Front) Party, to whom Bhutto promised repatriation of250,000
Moslems stranded in Bangladesh. When the MQM, one of Bhutto's main coalition partners,
decided to break away, ethnic violence resurfaced in Karachi, Pakistan's largest city, "where the
MQM had been restraining its street fighters" (MacFarquhar 1989 38). The ethnic conflict in the
Sindh province stemmed from tensions between the refugee Mohajirs mixed in with Punjabis
and other groups from elsewhere in Pakistan. In February, 1990, an anti-government strike, "plus
shoot-outs between Mohajirs and government supporters and several kidnappings, set off four
days of protest and killing" ("Desert and Sea" 36). Bhutto used to ..blame the chronic violence
of her home province on the divide-and-rule tactics of the late president. ... but the advent of [her]
much-acclaimed democratic rule has brought no lessening of Sindh' s lawlessness and political
feuding, rather the reverse" ("'Sins ofSind" 42). Ironically, Bhutto alienated her most staunch
advocates with her failure to live up to campaign promises. Rather than being the savior of the
poor and oppressed, many of Bhutto's actions contributed to the worsening of their condition.

Relation.'i with India
Bhutto worked in the first part of her term as Prime Minister to wann relations with
neighboring lndia. For the first time since the 1972 agreement after the war in Bangladesh. lndia
and Pakistan signed agreements. This time, Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi "agreed to promote
cultural exchange, to avoid double taxation, and not to attack each other's nuclear insta11ations,"
but did not resolve the conflict regarding Pakistan's support of Sikh terrorists in Punjab
("Wanner Enemies" 32). Later in the year Gandhi and Bhutto met to reach an agreement on
"how to end the bitter little undeclared war between the two countries" in Kashmir ("Cold War

Ends" 31 ). The territory of Kashmir has been disputed by Pakistan and India since their 194 7
independence. The prime ministers decided, however, that "India would move, stage by stage,
towards a Siachen disengagement, while Pakistan gradua11y reduced its suppon of the Sikh
separatists in Punjab" ("Cold War Ends" 31 ). Bhutto's signature to the document, however, is
not worth as much as one might think, since part of her deal with the army in order to gain power
was that Pakistan's Punjab policy would "remain under military control" ("Warmer Enemies"
32).
Bhutto's hands were tied later, in 1990, when Muslim separatists in Kashmir "surged
through the narrow alleys of the decrepit c1ty [Srinagar], chanting 'Indian dogs, go home! "' in
response to the detention of 400 accused terrorists" (Beyer 44 ). The military wanted to support
the Kashmir uprising, and cha11enge India's role as "regional pohceman" throughout southern
Asia (Shafqat 1997 234). Bhutto infuriated Prime Minister V.P. Singh, when she abandoned her
earlier position and "voiced support for the militant Kashmiris" (Beyer 44). Later, during her
second time as Prime Minister, Bhutto thanked the Labour Party for endorsing a "statement to
the effect 1hat Kashmir is 'disputed."' Such as statement makes it evident that "a Labour
government [would] not take a pro-Indian position over Kashmir" (Goodwin 7). Such a reversal
of opinions in regard to India reflected Bhutto's inability to stand by promises. In addition, it
demonstrates her tendency to move with the tides of opinion, changing her views in order to
benefit her personal political and economic position. Although she began her term as prime
minister by stressing the need to interact with India as another democratic nation (Shafqat J 996
665), by the end she openly supported the Kashrniri separatists.

Government Corruption and Failure in Democracy
Pakistan under Bhutto often failed the test of a true democracy, and was rife with

political deals and elite privi1eges. According some diplomats, Bhutto ..approached everything
from a partisan view of the world.... She became Prime Minster of the People's Party, not of

Pakistan" and as such "put I 0,387 people into government jobs without going through the proper
procedures" (MacFarquhar 1990 4 t ). Other criticism sheds light on why she was dismissed after

20 months as Prime Minister. Despite her foreign education, "Bhutto nevertheless seemed to
govern Pakistan as she would have a feudal kingdom. Her government appeared to operate

largely by petition� she bartered Cabinet seats for increased support in Par1iament, an she was

unwilling to allow the army, which she distrusted, to interfere in the violent politics of her power

base in Sindh" (Chua-Eoan 33).

Bhutto's second attempt at Prime Minister was not much better than her first. Price

hikes, inflation, and charges of corruption led to a crisis oflegitimacy for her second

government. The PPP, in its attempt to accumulate power, forgot the need to establish political

support from a wide variety of socio-economic groups in order to retain a wide power base.

Opposition leader Nawaz Sharif called Benazir' s government anti-people and pro-landowners,

and charged the government with mismanagement and corruption. Part of the mismanagement
involved the arrest of Sharifs close relations. In addition, "other opposition leaders awaiting

trial on various corruption charges [were] in jail, having been denied bail" ( ..Contempt of Court"
31 ). When the chainnan of the Senate and speaker of the National Assembly demanded that

parliament members awaiting trial be released when parliament was in session, Bhutto refused,

claiming "parliament cannot interfere with the workings of the judiciary" ("Contempt of Court"

31). Paradoxically, however, ••of the 20 new judges appointed to the Lahore High "Contempt of

Court", 13 were fonner activists in the ruling Pakistan People• s Party ... [and] three were
supporters of the Muslim League faction which supports Miss Bhutto's coalition government"
("Contempt of Court'' 32).
Actions such as these were responsible for Pakistani' s view that "their politicians [were]
corrupt and self-serving" ("'Pakistan" 3). Some said that "Bhutto has become just another Third
World pol, operating by the debased political code common to insecure democracies" (Griffin
52). Her version of democracy was a farce, for just "weeks after taking power she dismissed the
regional assembly in the state of Baluchistan after it voted no confidence in her local cronies"
(Beinart 12). When Bhutto's second government was dismissed on November 5, 1996, a feeling
of distrust and allegations of corruption remained over the heads of Benazir Bhutto and her
husband, Asif Zardari (Shafqat 1997 250).
Asif Zardari did not conduct himself appropriately for his role as spouse of the prime
minister. He became kno\m as "Mr. Ten Percent" for his shady financial deals which often
benefited both himself and his circle of friends (Shafqat 1997 233 ). He turned his position into a
source of power, and went on a shopping spree in the 1990's that included a $4 million London
estate, and $660,000 worth ofjewelry. In addition, Zardari and Bhutto constructed a $50 million
mansion as the prime minister's residence. Zardari used part of the $1.3 mi11ion park budget for
the construction of the estate's track, polo field, and stables. Overall, the Bhutto family and
associates received over $1.5 billion in illicit profits from kickbacks which were the result of
complex negotiations and special contracts designed by top Western executives (Burns A8).
Bhutto has stated that the documents are fabricated and that the corruption charges were
brought up by prime minister Nawaz Sharif in order to damage her reputation (Bums A8). Yet,
Benazir weakened the economy and had to negotiate foreign loans to pay off government debts

(Bums Al). She had fostered an image for herself as a leader who would work for the rights of
the poor and as an opponent of leaders who used power for personal gain and "leave the

cupboards bare" (Bums AS). But under her government, Pakistan remained a poor nation, with
over 70% of the population illiterate, and millions living without shelter, schools, hospitals, or
safe drinking water (Bums Al). Bhutto, who entered office with lofty speeches on re�

establishing democracy, failed to follow the principles of democracy, and instead fell into the

practices of "corruption, nepotism, an other abuses" (Lyon 2).

Ties to the United States
Bhutto's time at Harvard, and the connections she made while there, contributed to her

government's close partnership with the United States. Beginning in 1984 after she was

released from detention, Bhutto became a regular visitor in Washington, D.C.. While there, she

would use Peter Galbraith's office as a base for her calis, and her Harvard friend helped her win

friends in Congress (Galbraith 24). The friendships with Congressmen paid off. When Bhutto

visited the United States in June 1989, she was the first official visitor to the Bush

administration, and on the same v�sit, she delivered the Harvard commencement address. Her
speech focused on measures for enhancing democracy and respect for human rights. She also
spoke of the need to create an international organization of democratic nations "to uphold,

protect, and promote the idea of choosing government" (Galbraith 25). According to Bhutto, her
undergraduate experience contributed to her perception that "she understood American society,
including its contradictions .... She had, in fact, a kind of residual American self from her

Harvard years with which she could relate to the United States" (Starr 419).

Peter Galbraith reiterated Bhutto's understanding of the American mindset, crediting her
Harvard experience for her skill at gaining American allies in Congress. The United States
originally supported Zia's regime, because he criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
whereas certain members of the PPP supported the Soviets in the search for an ally against Zia.
Because the PPP was socialist in character, the United States was originally anti-Bhutto, viewing
her as radical, controversial, and dangerous. Bhutto listened to her friend Peter's advice,
however, and refined her message so as to convince the senators that her leadership would not be
harmful to U.S. interests. She promised the continue Zia's anti-Soviet policy in Afghanistan,
and emphasized her desire to overthrow a repressive dictatorship and restore democracy. Peter
Galbraith is convinced that it was Bhutto's knowledge of the American culture and her
connections to friends in the United States which helped her win U.S. support. He added that the
United States is partly responsible for her position as prime minister in 1989, for the PPP only
received a plurality of votes, not a majority, and therefore the president refused to name Benazir
Bhutto the prime minister. Since Bhutto had established relationships in Congress, the United
States stepped in and declared that indeed, Bhutto had won, and there was no question that
anyone else should receive the post (Phone Interview).
The partnership between Bhutto's Pakistan and the United States was mutua11y beneficial
to both parties. For the United States, "the election of a democratic government in Islamabad
[gave] Washington an incentive beyond simple anti-Sovietism for underwriting Pakistan"
(MacFarquhar 1989). For Bhutto, her image abroad as a democratic leaderjworking to restore
human rights compensated for her poor performance and low domestic approval ratings. The
relationship changed somewhat after 1990, for after the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan,
the United States withdrew support for Pakistan's nuclear program (''Pakistan" 2). A rising tide

Islamic fundamentalism, combined with the corruption in Bhutto's government, described as a
"commercial enterprise" (Griffin 52), led to a shift in Pakistani views towards America. In fact,
Bhutto's rating was "further hurt by her close links with the United States, which looms large in
Pakistan's pantheon as Great Savior, Great Satan, or both at once"(Griffin 52). The Prime
Minister spent much of her time visiting overseas governments, visiting over 25 countries in 17
months, and did not return home when major crises, such as the murder of two Americans,
occurred. Thus, although Bhutto was skilled at developing relationships with other countries,
she did not use her ability to develop exchanges which would benefit the people of her country.
Rather, many of her deals simply boosted her own image as a "democratic" leader or served to
improve her own financial position while pandering to foreign interests (Griffin 52).

Analysis
It seems as though Benazir Bhutto's foreign education did not greatly influence her
leadership, but that is difficult to say because of the restrictive political context. Indeed, a
classmate asserted that "Benazir Bhutto's Harvard years should not be overinterpreted. Long
before she showed up at Cambridge, she had been deeply formed by the dynamics of history,
class, and political position" (Starr 457). For Benazir, the Bhutto name was central to her
identity, weighing "far more heavily than the seven years she spent getting educated and
acclimatized in Western ways at Harvard and Oxford (MacFarquhar 1990 41 ). Perhaps because
she presumed privileges came automatically with her name, Bhutto was described by Harvard
professor as "not a born compromiser, but intelligent enough to be a realist" (Palmer). This
characteristic surfaced quickly in her leadership, or lack thereof One friend explained that
Bhutto "never made the transition from being leader of a crusade to being a governing Prime

Minister." Instead, her government ..became a one-woman show.... [which] put a premium on
loyalty and reinforced a belief that democracy in Pakistan is synonymous with Bhutto-family
rule" (MacFarquhar 1990 40).
Initially, Bhutto's leadership was heralded by the international community. Bhutto
proved skilled at '"improvis[ing] new tunes----democracy, feminism, Islam-to dazzle divergent
American audiences, con Congress and keep the money coming" (Beinart 12). Bhutto's
promises, however, never materialized into reality, and she did not demonstrate her commitment
to progressive ideals once in the position of prime minister (Shafqat I 996 656).
Bhutto failed to live up to the expectations of feminists, who hoped a female Prime
Minister would free them from some of the restrictions placed on them during the Zia regime.
Although she promised to change the adultery laws and repeal the Hudood Ordinances. she never
implemented policy changes, largely due to a fear oflslamic fundamentalists. Additionally,
what inroads she did make, could be attributed to the legacy of her father, who had campaigned
for women's rights, and even inducted women into all branches of the elite civil service (Rafi.
18). Bhutto also failed to increase social spending on programs which would benefit the poor.
Instead, her new budget hit the working class the hardest, while containing provisions which
exempted the wealthy. Although Bhutto did not have much money to a11ocate, since a large
portion of the budget had to go to debt-servicing, she was able to find money to increase the
military budget.
Bhutto's policy towards India shifted rather dramatically during her time in power. At
first she did work for improved relations between the two nations, but due to the militarfs
control of foreign policy, her freedom of action was restricted Bhutto stressed the idea that
Pakistan and India were both democracies, and as such should cooperate. This line of reasoning

seems to fit with her Harvard experience, which continual1y emphasized the importance of
democracy, freedom of speech, and Constitutional rule. Bhutto's outreach to Raj iv Gandhi,
prime minister oflndia could, however, have resulted from her father's influence. After a11,
Benazir accompanied her father to India in 1972 for the negotiation of the Simla Accords, with
Rajiv's mother, Indira Gandhi, while on break from Harvard. In any case, it seems significant
that Bhutto was not consistent in her policy towards India. Although she originally sought to
reach a peaceful settlement in Kashmir, she later switched her views and encouraged the Labour
Party to call the region '"disputed.•• The Prime Minister had difficulty establishing a policy and
remaining constant to it.
Even Benazir's claim that she learned the importance of legitimate government from her
classes at Harvard fail to ring true. For it is evident that she did not make an effort to
democratize the structure of PPP, and when in power she sought to consolidate personal power
rather than work to represent a wide variety of socio-economic classes (Shafqat 1996 657). The
corruption charges further illustrate her failure to incorporate the tenets of democracy into her
government. Bhutto was raised in an environment of wealth and advantage, and her short time
in the United States, especially at a privileged university like Harvard, was not enough to
overcome her sense of social superiority or her assumed position in the social hierarchy. Despite
her relative anonymity as a Harvard student Benazir never forgot she was a Bhutto, and perhaps
felt that ruling Pakistan was part of her inheritance. Zul:fikar Ali Bhutto purposefu11y kept
Benazir from spending too much time outside of Pakistan, and even when she was in school,
classmates commented that she never forgot her role as the prime minister's daughter.
Benazir Bhutto, therefore seems to be a leader who's family connections and political
history are so powerful that they provide one with an identity, the answers, and the model for

governance. Even though she did go to school overseas for seven years, Benazir remained in

close contact with her family, and often joined her father when he was in the United States on

political or diplomatic missions. In addition, since such dramatic events unfolded in Pakistan
during her time as a student. Bhutto's patriotism and loyalty to her country increased

dramatica11y as a defense mechanism against the thousands of Harvard students and professors

who condemned Pakistan's actions. This socio--political context may have contributed as much
as her elite family background to Bhutto's close ties to her Pakistani identity. Indeed, the one

example Peter Galbraith gave of how "Benazir synthesized in her leadership the two cultures,"
was that she still practiced tribal customs- such as holding feudal court and ordering people

around- while also speaking and understanding the language of the West (Phone Interview).
One major lesson Benazir Bhutto did take away from Harvard was the vocabulary of

democracy. Bhutto learned the characteristics ofa model democracy, and learned the values

espoused in the U.S. Constitution. Although Bhutto never truly applied the principles of

democratic rule in Pakistan, she did use democratic rhetoric in her campaign speeches, in her

autobiography, and in her correspondence with foreign officials. In this way, Bhutto capitalized

on dualistic American foreign policy which treated any "democratic" country as an ally, and any

"socialist" country as an enemy. Her actions, thusly interpreted, serve as an example of what

F.G. Bailey calls "leadership [as] the art of exploiting cultures" (BaiJey 46). Bhutto drew on the

democratic values of the United States, but used them in the Pakistani context by gaining

international respect, ascending to power and then using her position to amass personal prestige,

wealth, and authority.

SHIMON PERES
Personal Background
Shimon Peres was born in 1923 in a poor Polish town where Jewish identity was
expressed in the form of Zionism rather than religion (Golan 8). At age 10 his family moved to
Palestine, where the young Shimon became active in Hanoar Ha'oved, a youth movement which
focused on training for kibbutz life. Although his heart was not in his studies, Peres wrote
metaphysical poetry and read extensively on his own (Avrech 56). In Israel, his formal
education ended after attending a commercial high school, for as a 15•year•old he took the oath
to join the Haganah and fought with the underground army to expel the British from Palestine
(Avrech 56). Shortly thereafter, his determination, hard work, ability to get things done, and
sheer ambition took him to the top of the youth movement (Golan 10). He eventually became
head of manpower in the headquarters ofHaganah (Wakin 125), a position which Peres loved
and which enabled him to develop the skill of handling challenges with minimal resources
(Golan 18). David Ben Gurion, the first prime minister oflsrael, re1ied on Peres' administrative
talents, and others who were envious of Peres' position of"favorite" accused him of being a
"climber" (Wakin 126).
After the Israeli War for Independence Peres asked Ben Gurion ifhe could have
permission to study, as he had never received a formal education. Although he could not speak
much English and had never been to the United States, Ben Gurion granted him permission to
study provided he did so in the United States while heading the Israeli purchasing mission. Peres
left for the United States in 1949, and returned in 1951 once his mission was accomplished
(Golan 19). While in New York Peres studied at the New School for Social Research (Wakin
125), which he caUed a "most remarkable institution ... [with faculty including] such luminaries

as Justice Felix Frankfurter, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Max Lerner. .. From Reinhold Niebuhr 1
heard lectures on Jewish and Greek culture that left me spellbound" (Peres 1995 73).
After two years in New York, Peres traveled to Boston, where he completed the four
month Advanced Management Program (AMP) at the Harvard Business School. The AMP was
an intensive course aimed at experienced executives ( 15-20 years of experience) who were
targeted for future leadership positions within their respective companies. The purpose of the
course, which was organized around case studies, was for the class to participate and learn
through sharing their own experiences, ideas, and thoughts (AMP Circulation Flierl). Although
the participants were trained in specific administrative practices and procedures, the faculty had
a practical approach and chosen cases which were realistic and drawn from a diverse field of
industry (AMP Circulation Flier 3). The primary goals of the program were to "1 )Develop
competence in the management of business activity, 2)Develop the social skills needed to make
business a good society, and 3)Encourage the wiUingness to participate constructively in the
community and nation" (AMP Circulation Flier 4). Over the course of twelve weeks, the faculty
covered the topics of business policy, administrative practices, business and the American
society, cost and financial administration, marketing management, and problems in labor
relations (AMP Circulation Flier 6).
Perhaps more important than the official subjects taught, was the contact with other
students. The 1951 AMP session consisted of 171 students, of which 13 were United States
servicemen, and 4 were government employees. Of those representing governments,

an were

foreign, and all represented new governmental agencies. As far as industrial membership, the oil
industry topped the list with 37 representatives (List of AMP Statistics). Peres was a minority in
the AMP Class of December 1951. Over two-thirds of the class had a college degree, many of

whom also had higher degrees. In addition, the average age of the group was 44, fifteen years
older than Peres; only twelve individuals were under the age of 35 (List of AMP Statistics). The
time at Harvard provided Peres with an opportunity to gain exposure to a wide variety of
industries, to make invaluable contacts with businessmen and servicemen in the United States, as
well as gave him a structural foundation for management. When asked about his experience at
Harvard, Peres said it "definitely influenced his leadership" and adds that his time at Harvard
was the "best four months of [his] life" (Forum, 1998). From his 1995 vantage point, Peres calls
his stay in the United States "a period of constant and concentrated learning in myriad forms. It
was a formative period both of my life and of my intellectual and political development" (Peres
1995 73).

Political Background
Shimon Peres has been an active member in Israeli politics throughout the entire history
of the fifty-year old country. In 1952 at the age of 28, his "brilliant performance" managing
weapons transfers from Czechoslovakia, Italy, Canada, and France led to David Ben-Gurion's
appointment of Peres as deputy director of the defense ministry (Heilbrunn 15). A year later, as
director general at the Ministry of Defense, Peres "identified France as Israel's most likely
source of nuclear assistance, even though France itself was still undecided about its own nuclear
future"(Cohen 16). The "political protege" of prime minister David Ben Gurion, Peres was
given the mandate to pursue his nuclear vision. The Dimona nuclear project in the Negev desert
is perhaps the greatest accomplishment of this period of Peres' career. He presided over the
project for almost a decade, beginning "in 1956-57 [when], virtually alone, Peres exploited the
unique political climate of the decentralized Fourth Republic in France, secretly arranging the

sale of a nuclear reactor and other sensitive components to 1srael" (Cohen 16). ln the 1960s.
however. the United States became Israel's leading military supplier. Starting with the
breakthrough deal Peres negotiated on the Hawk missile system, The United States. which
originally refused any arms deals with Israel, became the nation's number one arms supplier
(Wakin 127).
In 1965 Peres and Moshe Dayan joined David Ben-Gurion in the formation of the Rafi
Party, but "once the 1967 war erupted, Peres arranged a truce inside Israel between the Mapai
and the Rafi factions that resulted in the creation of the Labor Party" (Heilbrunn 16). The
French military connection established through Peres proved critical in during the Six Day War
(Salpeter 4), but he was sidelined by Golda Meir in the subsequent government, and did not
regain a position ofimport until Rabin appointed him defense minister in 1974. Even then,
however, Rabin commented, .. I did not regard Peres as suitable since he had never fought in the
IDF and his experience in purchasing arms did not make up for that experience ... I accepted
Peres... with a heavy heart" (Heilbrunn 16).
The next years were fu11 of strife between Rabin and Peres as they battled for party
leadership. During the Entebbe crisis oft 976, however, when Palestinian terrorists hijacked an
Air France plane containing 100 Israeli passengers, the two men were able to work together
(Wakin 129). The rescue plan was a success largely because Peres had ••ruthlessly overhauled the
army ... restor[ing] its morale and equipment" in his role as defense minister (Heilbrunn 16).
Despite his handling of the Entebbe crisis, Peres lost party leadership to Rabin by a margin of 41
votes in 1977 ( Golan t 6 7). When Rabin resigned as prime minister over a currency scandal,
Peres served as interim prime minister until the next elections, when Likud Party, under
Menachem Begin's leadership came to power for the first time in 29 years (Golan 171).

By the mid 1980s, Israelis began to feel that Peres was a congenital loser, a politician
rather than a leader (Golan 226). He was seen by many as an eloquent, smooth-talking
politician who thrived on back room maneuvering (Wakin 128), and was described during intra
party battles as '"an intriguer and backstabber"(Salpeter 4 ). Peres was further discredited by the
late prime minister Rabin, who called Peres "an inveterate schemer" (Salpeter 4).

Prime Minister and Other Leadership Roles

The 1984 elections ended in a stalemate. The Labor Party won 44 seats, and the Likud

won 41. Since neither party had a clear majority, Peres had to work with Yitzhak Shamir to
form a government, a difficult business due to the political and ideological differences between
the parties. As Peres announced to the Knesset, "This government was born on divided ground,
constructed on unknown precedents, and completed with the delicate work of straightening
things out" (Golan 234). This "national unity government," cobbled together by the two
leaders, ca11ed for a rotating premiership, with Peres serving as prime minister first (Heilbrunn
16).
Going into an extremely tense situation in a country divided over the 1982 invasion of
Lebanon and suffering from soaring inflation, Peres had four primary goals. First, he "promised
an early troop withdrawal [from Lebanon]. He also pledged to restore Israel's ailing economy to
health and to bring down its staggering triple-digit inflation rate. He committed himself to
wanning up what he called the "cold peace" with Egypt... and he would seek ways of ending the
nearly 40-year-old conflict between Israelis and Arabs" (Smith 86 48).

Economy
Peres was first elected to the office of prime minister in 1984 at time when Israel had the
world's largest per capita external debt (Keren 77). The most stunning success of his term,
therefore, was his ability to turn around the economy (Wakin 131 ). The prime minister's first
words in office were, "Let's start-get me the Minister of Finance" (Avrech 56). With the
backing of the National Unity government, Peres "unveiled a new reform program that ha[d] a
lot in common with Reagonomics ... The government plan[ned] to reduce spending and cut
taxes" (Richman 98). In addition, Peres devalued the shekel, and planned to "cut a billion dollars
out of the national budget" (Avrech 56).
The connection to Reagonomics was no coincidence. Three weeks into his tenure as
Prime Minister, Peres traveled to the United States to meet with the U.S. President. After
meeting, the two leaders "announced the formation of a special committee made up of
government and business leaders from their countries to find ways of directing future U.S. aid
toward bringing about a long-range Israeli economic recovery" (Smith 1984 62). Other
economic initiatives undertaken by Peres included the reduction of imports, and the "seemingly
impossible feat of persuading the dominant Histradut union federation to renounce the cherished
system of index-linked pay increases (Smith 1986 49). Although his economic plan was tough,
and many Israelis protested when it was announced (Golan 249), Peres was able to reduce
Israel's triple digit inflation to 15-18% (Salpeter 5). Despite the fact that his economist friends
told him it "would be political suicide to try to clean up the mess" (Richman 98) of the 800%
inflation (Smith 1986 48), Peres' approval rating "soared from below 45% to 73%, largely
because of the drop in inflation" (Richman 98).

Intellectual Community
Peres's "infatuation" with science and technology began in childhood, as did his love of
poetry (Heilbrunn 14). As an adult, Peres is "clearly at home in the world of high culture"
(Peretz 51 ). Introduced to a group fu]] of intellectuals in 1985 as '"the most literate head of
government in the wor]d today," the prime minister has even translated French and English
poems into Hebrew (Peretz 51). Peres has, however found the "versatility to sustain a bookish
life of the mind while simultaneously handling practical matters of state" (Avrech 55). During a
trip to New York the prime minister met with experts in the field of technology in order to
pursue the acquisition of such industries in Israel, and also met with writers including Arthur
Miller (Avrech 55).
Perhaps because of his intellectual reputation, while in power Peres was supported by
professionals and University professors, who sought the transfonnation oflsrael into a society
based on infonnation and education (Keren 22) rather than one which focused on meeting the
immediate needs of the masses (Keren 18). Peres came into leadership when the knowledge
elite felt that the Likud Party was nationalist, traditionalist, anti-Arab, and anti-intellectual
(Keren 3). He worked to increase industrial development, and took a personal role in negotiating
deals between the government and industry for controlling prices and wages, often without the
support of the finance minister (Keren 87). In contrast to Rabin, Peres did not make decisions
without "extensive consultation" (Salpeter 6). He hired a staff of"academics in their 20s and
30s" (Avrech 56), who worked around the clock to help jump-start the economy and
technological industry. Later in his career, when serving under Rabin, Peres used intellectuals to
address another societal crisis, that of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In 1992, Peres "authorized

two university professors to sound out the PLO" (Heilbrunn 16) in regard to the possibility of
peace negotiations.

Peace Process
One of the issues that distinguishes Shimon Peres as an Israe1i leader is his tireless efforts
in pursuit of a peaceful settlement to the Middle East conflicts. His role in the Arab-lsraeli
peace process began before his role as prime minister, and extended long after his tenure was
over. During the 1984 national unity government Peres tried to set up fonnal negotiations with
Jordan and Palestine, but the coalition banned negotiations with the PLO. He also wanted to
require a two-thirds Cabinet approval for the construction of any new Jewish settlements in the
occupied West Bank, but right-wing members of the Likud party refused ("Truly Revolutionary
Idea" 24). Instead of giving up al1 hopes for peace, however, Peres met with Jordan's King
Hussein and discussed a settlement, even though both knew that the unity government would
object to any compromises (Keren 52). The prime minister was more successful in Egypt, where
he was able to reach an agreement to submit the Taha dispute, concerning 750 yards along the
Red Sea, to international arbitration. With this decision, Israel and Egypt restored full
diplomatic relations with each other for the first time since the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon
(Smith 1986 48). Not everyone supported Peres's efforts for peace, however, especially within
the Israeli government. Israeli Minister for Trade and Industry, Ariel Sharon, "publicly accused
Prime Minister Shimon Peres of 'unparalJeled cynicism' in his handling of secret Middle East
peace negotiations" (Smo1owe 74).
Over the years Peres has "impressed even the most skeptical observers with his eagerness
to take the necessary risks for peace" (Peretz 51 ), but he has also been severely criticized. Peres

met with Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in Vienna in 1978 despite objections by Foreign
Minister Dayan, and Prime Minister Begin. The Vienna document written by Sadat and Peres
laid the groundwork for the 1979 Camp David Accords between Begin and Sadat (Golan 186).
This was quite a change in attitude from the Peres of 1967. In 1995 Peres said .. [my]
contribution during that dramatic period [Six Day War] was something that I sti11 cannot write
about openly for reasons of state security. After [Moshe] Dayan was appointed defense minister
I submitted to him a certain proposal which ... would have deterred the Arabs and prevented the
war" (Cohen 17). The ..hawk" of the 1970s, who suggested the use ofa nuclear demonstration
to prevent war, had transformed by the 1980s into a leader who felt the only resolution to the
Middle Eastern conflict was through political means and worth the exchange of "territory for
peace" (Golan 301 ).
The Oslo Peace Accords are, however, Peres' s most noteworthy achievement for peace.
In the 1992 elections, Labor won with a commitment to pursue peace, and as foreign minister,
Peres declared that "first and foremost, we must all acknowledge the futility of war. The Arabs
cannot defeat Israel on the battlefield; Israel cannot dictate the conditions for peace to the
Arabs" (Wakin 132). Secret negotiations, which had begun between Palestinian and Israeli
scholars, turned into official talks when Peres received a letter from the PLO opening the doors
to an official meeting for peace between Palestinian and Israeli leaders (Wakin 133). Peres and
Arafat agreed to halt what Peres called "two paraUel governmental systems with contradictory
sets of values. By its very nature, the military government is oppressive---to the people it rules
and to the people of the state" (Wall 212). Peres called the status quo "senseless," and added
that "a nation that forces itself on another nation, even for reasons of self-defense, loses the will
to abstain from oppression because of the dynamics of conquest-a part of the same 'invisible

profitab1e so1utions to problems such as electricity, economics, and water. the Palestinians and
Israelis can create a stable environment for peaceful human interactions {Forum speech).

Analysis
In both his speech to the Richmond Forum and a speech in Jerusalem's Hebrew
University, Peres outlined three lessons in leadership he was taught by Ben-Gurion. The first
states that a leader knows exactly what his goals are and does not let himself sway from them.
The second states that a head of state, not the public, should lead. The final lessons states that a
leader must not be afraid to take risks {Salpeter 6). Upon examination, Peres's leadership fulfills
all three of this characteristics. During his time as prime minister in the national unity
government, Peres set forth to overcome the soaring inflation rate, and his dramatic measures
stabilized the Israeli economy. In that situation, as wen as in his secret negotiations which
initiated the 1992 Oslo Peace Accords, Peres took leadership into his own hands, despite the
possibility of a drop in public opinion or the wrath of the Likud Party. Peres also took risks by
reaching out to the Palestinians and other Arab nations, extending a hand of peace which many
Israelis were not yet wi1ling to proffer.
These leadership qualities were not always inherent in Shimon Peres, however. As Peres
says, "Israel has come a long way from a young country that needed Dimona to deter war, to a
strong country on the brink of peace" {Cohen 17). The same could be said of Peres, who began
his career as a "militant Zionist" intent on '"bombing Egypt, raiding the Western desert, [and]
fighting frantically over the Canal" (Perlmutter 54 ). Today a leading advocate for peace, Peres
believes it is the role of a leader to encourage people to create a coalition in order to cooperate
against new societal dangers rather than compete against old ideological enemies (Forum

speech). The mature statesman said that he was sincere when he said the Israelis "had no wish
to rule over the Palestinian people" (Peres 1995 302). Further, Peres dreams of a Middle East
"in which every believer will be free to pray in his own language, Arabic or Hebrew or Latin or
whatever language he chooses, and in which his prayers will reach their destination without
censorship, without interference, and without offending anyone" (Peres 1995 310). Statements
such as these mark a dramatic shift in position from the Peres of the 1960s defense ministry, and
a marked move towards seeing the Arab point of view and comparing it to the Israeli position
under Great Britain.
Peres's participation in the formation of the national unity government also demonstrates
his remarkable ability to work across cultures and ideological rifts. Only one other unity
government, formed in 1967 on the eve of the Six-Day War, had ever been agreed upon before
("Truly Revolutionary Idea" 24). The reason for their rarity in the extreme difficulty of
negotiating policy when leaders of opposing parties are forced to find common ground. Peres
was praised for his "deft handling of the nation's problems" and his ability "despite strong
pressure from within his party ..... [to resist] the temptation to force showdowns with his coalition
partners, which might have broken the accord and led to early elections" (Smith 1986 48).
Looking back on the experience, Peres said "decision making is desperately hard in a cabinet
evenly ba1anced between ministers from opposing parties ..... [nevertheless] to my pleasant
surprise, the government of national unity was able to reach and implement important decisions,
at least during the first half of its term'' (Peres 1995 209). Peres's O\W leadership and assertive
role during the economic crisis was Jargely responsible for the success of the first two years of
the national unity government.

Peres's leadership is also noteworthy for his ability to synthesize the economy, education,
and peace together into a concrete, inter-related process. According to Peres, "fate has brought
us from a world of territorial conflict to one of economic cha1lenge and of new opportunities
created by human intellectual advances" (Heilbrunn 14). Heilbrunn criticizes Peres's optimistic
vision, however, arguing that because oflsrael's huge technical advantage over its Arab
neighbors, a common market will never occur in the Middle East. Further, the author disputes
Peres' assumption that poverty is the root of fundamentalism, asserting that Islamic
fundamentalism is "rooted largely in anti-Western currents" (Heilbrunn 18). He goes on to state
that "while Peres sees technological advances as synonymous with higher standards of living,
sometimes these advances just create bigger rifts between the haves and have-nots" (Peres 1995
19). These statements detract from the otherwise glowing praise of Shimon Peres, the Israeli
statesman who has perhaps done the most work to promote peace and justice in the Middle East.
Several key questions remain to be asked in regard to Shimon Peres's leadership.
Although his experiences in the peace process and in the national unity government demonstrate
his ability to work with those of differing political, ideological, and religious views, that does not
necessarily qualify him as a "bridge leader." Granted, Peres is one of relatively few Israelis who
has put himself on the line to try to understand the perspective of the Palestinian people, but he
also is scorned by a large number ofisraeH nationalists, and lost (by a narrow margin) the 1996
elections to Benjamin Netanyahu. The most critical unanswered question, however, is what is
responsible for the dramatic shift in Peres's position from that of an "old hawk" (Perlmutter 136)
to a leading proponent of peace? Although it would be convenient to state that Peres' exposure
to U.S. pluralist democracy during his stay in New York and Boston was the key, the shift in
Peres's stance did not occur until 20 years after his educational experience. While his book does

praise the U.S. Constitution for its attempt "to strike a fine balance between the rights of the
individual and his duty to society, between religious tolerance and ethnic identity" and
commends the fact that the U.S. has never "attempted to retain either [foreign] territories or
resources, or to rule over another nation" (Peres 1995 74)� one can hardly believe that those
factors alone led to his dramatic shift from militant hawk to conciliatory dove.
The two years Peres spent in the United States probably did have some impact on his
leadership, but most likely in regard to his ability to forge close relations between Israel and the
United States. In addition, Peres' affinity for the intellectual and technological community was
probably augmented by his exposure to a wide range ofleading industrialists during the four
month Advanced Management Program at Harvard. As he himself suggested in the Richmond
Forum, however, the me11owing of old age, and the exhaustion from long years of party conflict
are more plausible explanations his shift towards regional cooperation.

CONCLUSIONS
The three cases studied in this paper lead individually to three very different
interpretations regarding the effects of cross-cultural education. Collectively, however, they do
seem to point to the potential impact of a cross-cultural experience. Mary Robinson's example
seems to demonstrate that cross-cultural education can have an extremely powerful influence on
someone, especially when lessons in the classroom are enhanced and further given credence by
the host country's social and political events. The young Mary Robinson was encouraged to
think about, discuss, and interpret the ambiguities in the law, in a context where students
protesting the Vietnam War and campaigning for the equality of women and blacks were forcing
American society to examine its own beliefs and practices.

Benazir Bhutto's case, in contrast, demonstrates the strong effect one's fami1y ties and

socia1 background can have on one's 1eadership and one's career path. A1though Benazir is the

individual who studied the longest overseas, spending four years at Radc1iffe and another four at

Oxford, in many ways her leadership exhibits the fewest foreign effects. Instead, her Western

views and her focus (at least in political rhetoric) on democracy and women's rights seem to be
1argely the legacy of her father, prime minister in the 1970s, who appointed women to high

positions, negotiated agreements with India, and contributed to the Constitution of 1973. While
the ideology her father hoped to imbue in her may have been solidified by her experiences

abroad, Benazir remained closely in touch with her family and events in Pakistan the entire time

she was at school. In many ways, although Benazir adopted some of the outward symbols of the

American col1ege student, she never forgot her heritage, and never fully assimilated into the

student culture at Harvard, flying off to Simla to participate in the 1972 agreement, and sitting in

on UN General Assembly meetings.

The Shimon Peres case is different from both women. Like Robinson, Peres does

demonstrate some changes in his leadership style and in terms of his focus from issues of war to

issues of peace. Unlike Robinson, however, who returned to Ireland and immediately began her

work to improve the life of those at a disadvantage, Peres' values and worldview did not change
significantly until the late 1970s, almost 30 years after his experience in the United States.

When the change did occur, however. it was significant and substantial. Before that point,

however, Peres exhibited other qualities of a ..bridge 1eader," which could be a direct result from
his two years of education in the United States. Throughout his po1itical career. Peres was noted

for his persistence, his skill for arriving at creative solutions, and his ability to work with people
he personally did not like. For instance, Peres and Rabin. Jong-time competitors for leadership

of the Labor party, were able to act as a team throughout several of Rabin's ministries, and, more
importantly, were jointly awarded a Nobel Peace Prize. Peres was also able to successful tum the
economy around in a difficult situation, when he was heading a unity government with a ruling
coalition that opposed many of the policies he felt strongly about.
These three leaders had diverse leadership experiences, but an examination of their work
for peace, their handling of ethnic differences, and the degree to which they exhibited autonomy
in their actions, leads to an understanding of the leaders' relative ability to bridge cultures.

Peace Issues

To a certain extent, all three leaders worked to create peace, and two, Robinson and
Peres, made the additional connection between peace and economic circumstances. Mary
Robinson maintained an open policy towards the Northern Ireland issue, stating that she would
listen to anyone who had a legitimate political concern or platform to present. She invited
representatives from a wide variety of groups to Ireland in order to promote dialogue. In
addition, although she created an international controversy when she shook hands with Sinn
Fein's Geny Adams, Robinson continued her policy of extending the same treatment to all sides
of the Northern question. This approach by Robinson demonstrates an open, accepting view of
others, as well as an understanding that for every conflict there are numerous points of view, all
of which deserve a hearing in a receptive audience.
Robinson also openly voiced compassion for the starving masses in Somalia, and pled for
assistance on their behalf in front of the United Nations General Assembly. She opened the
presidential mansion to individuals of aJI socio-economic classes, and included in her welcome
marginalized groups such as homosexuals. Currently, the former president continues her service

to those less fortunate by chairing the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. For the
former president, economics and peace were linked to the extent that harsh physical

circumstances could lead to increased frustration and willingness to fight for food, land, shelter,

and respect This connection, and Robinson's ability to recognize the interaction between

poverty and violence, also demonstrates her skill at seeing the "big picture."

Benazir Bhutto also spoke a great deal about peace and issues of the developing world,

but her actions did not always follow her words. Although at first she worked to change

Pakistan's relationship with India, her hands were tied by the power of the mi1itary and the

public's perception that India remained a security threat. Her commitment to peace was later

discredited when she reversed her perspective on relations with India by declaring the Kashmir

region '"disputed." Bhutto did not follow through on her commitment to socio-economic justice,
either, for her campaign promise to increase social programs did not ever materialize into

policies or programs, and the PPP had to discard its socialist platform in order to comply with

the IMF regulations. Between debt-servicing, defense spending, and alleged government

corruption, little money was left for social welfare, which caused resentment among the masses,
division within the ruling coalition, and a rise in Islamic fundamentalism. Overall, Bhutto did
not seem effective in the peace-making process, and her inability to carry through on her

promises reflects not only a completely relative value system, but an insecurity about the validity

of her 0Vv11 beliefs and opinions.

Although it came late in his political career, Shimon Peres made great strides towards

peace in the Middle East. He worked throughout his political career on various settlements with
King Hussein of Jordan, and during his terms as prime minister he was successful at improving
Israel's relations with neighboring Arab countries. The highlight of his peacemaking career,

however, was his active role in negotiating the Oslo Agreement in 1994 with PLO chainnan
Vasser Arafat. In order to achieve such treaty, Peres had to see beyond his own opinion of the
Middle East conflict, and try to understand and appreciate the concerns from the Palestinian
perspective. Also, since at the time it was illegal to negotiate with the PLO, Peres was forced to
use creative problem-solving techniques in order to do what he felt in his heart was right.
Peres, to a greater extent than Robinson, links economic policy with the pursuit of peace.
His view of a "New Middle East" emphasizes the privatization of peace and the need to initiate
cooperative economic development with Arabs and Israelis. He believes that peace cannot occur
without an increased standard ofliving for the Arabs living in and around Israel. Although his
concern for peace and economic development remains regional, not global, Peres demonstrates
his desire to improve the lives of others, which is evidence of an expanded worldview.

Ability to Create Unity out ofDifference
The three leaders varied in their success at creating a sense of unity (perhaps analogous
to Adler's cultural synergy), when faced with diversity. From these initial cases, it seems as
though Robinson and Peres were better able to create a new identity out of diverse viewpoints, or
at least to create a vision for one. Bhutto, however, did not seem as capable either at articulating
a common vision for her followers, or at establishing a Pakistani identity.
Mary Robinson created a presidency full of symbols in order to tap into a feeling of Irish
identity, such as keeping a light on as a welcoming guidepost to all those of Irish descent who
live overseas. In addition, she reached out to the various constituencies in Northern Ireland
without making political connections to any single group. During her campaign, Robinson
traveled all over the country, visiting every town and village, in order to hear the views of those

she would represent. In addition, Robinson made the presidential mansion open to any group
that wished to visit. Through her leadership, she appealed to a sense of Irish pride, and by
supporting and encouraging grassroots initiatives, Robinson tried to make everyone feel
important and critical to the success of Ireland.
Bhutto campaigned to re-establish a modem democracy in a country divided by class,
religious, and ethnic differences, but it is difficult to detennine whether she could not achieve
those aims due to the political context, or whether she never truly intended to do so. Bhutto
failed to create a unique Pakistani identity in a country where the citizens remained focused on
.whether they were Mohajir or Sindhi by birth, and in which disagreements with India over the
status of Kashmir continued. While she was in office, the conflict in Sindh actually worsene�
partly due to the weakness of Bhutto's government. Granted, Pakistan is an incredibly diverse
country with a long history of ethnic conflicts, but Bhutto's leadership did not demonstrate any
initiative at finding, or skill at developing, common ground among its numerous ethnic groups or
social classes.
Peres, like Bhutto, faced the challenge ofleading a country with considerable ethnic
differences. Israel was created by a wide variety of Jews from all over the world and with all
different ancestry, ranging from Africa to Asia to Eastern Europe. Israel, like Pakistan, had only
been independent since the late 1940s, and was concerned both with building a solid
international reputation and creating a national identity. Also like Pakistan, Israel had ethnic
conflict not only within its own citizenry, but also with the Palestinians living within and around
Israel proper. Peres, however, despite difficulties with other Israeli parties in power, was more
successful than Bhutto in devising a plan for the creation of an Israel shared by Palestinians and

Israelis, and in envisioning a "'new Middle East" in which economic regiona] cooperation serves
as a tool to overcome ethnic differences and create a sense of unity.

Increased Individual Autonomy as Leaders
Kauffinann's model for the effects of study abroad stresses not only the development of

autonomy, but also the ability to choose a set of values after exposure to a wide variety of belief
systems. According to Kauffmann, the highest level of autonomy involves an "integrated

ethnorelativisrn" (see Appendix 2), which allows one to make ethical choices in a relativistic

world without insulting other cultural practices by presenting one's own views as superior. The

three leaders in this study varied in the degree to which the seemed to act independently and
against either the status quo or the dominant political stance.

Mary Robinson remained an independent candidate for the majority of her political

career, and repeatedly took a vocal stance on controversial issues such as family planning and

homosexuality. When Robinson did join a political party, she did so out of a commitment to the
mission of the of the party. Once her beliefs did not coincide with the actions of the Labour

Party, however, Robinson separated from the group. Robinson also demonstrated her ability to
make ethical choices in a global environment in her role as the UN high commissioner for

human rights, where she has confronted international leaders about their country's abuses.

Perhaps because of her commitment to the ideals of human justice, Robinson does not hesitate to

condemn China's human rights record as abusive, instead of accepting the potential argument

that China has a different cultural value system.

Benazir Bhutto, however, does not seem to exhibit the same independence as Mary

Robinson. For Benazir, much of her identity is connected to the name "Bhutto." It appears that

it is from this name, this political, economic, and cultural heritage that she derives her identity,
rather than any individual beliefs or values. In some ways, Bhutto would seem to be at
Kauffmann's lowest level of value development, inherited. Bhutto's campaign largely revolved
around restoring the democracy established under her father, and during her time in office she
did not seem to distinguish herself as an individual committed to a certain platform. While part
of this might be blamed on the military's power and the agreements Bhutto made in order to gain
power, not all of it should be so easily brushed aside. In regard to Kashmir, for example, Bhutto
initia11y sought better relations with India, but then backed down. She did not espouse a
coherent women's rights platform, either, promising an increase in freedom, but later backing
away from any substantial legislative action. Bhutto was afraid of the response of the military in
the first instance, and of the mullahs in the second. The subordination of her promises in the
face of others' disagreement does not seem to indicate a strong sense of autonomy or a well
developed set of owned values. The few areas where Bhutto did demonstrate independence
seemed to relate to governmental corruption and the abuse of power, when Bhutto did not seem
to feel the law of democracy and equality applied to her as well.
Shimon Peres became more of an independent actor as time went by. In his early days,
Peres acted under the guidance of his mentor, David Ben-Gurion, and was often criticized by
others for this close affiliation. As he matured and gained confidence in his abilities as a
politician, however, Peres stepped out on his own, sometimes defying orders in order to pursue
issues which he felt were important. Peres' meeting with Anwar Sadat in Vienna, for example,
was not authorized by foreign minister Moshe Dayan, but he continued with the summit
nevertheless. Likewise, Peres negotiated secretly with the PLO before official negotiations
between the groups were allowed by the Israeli government.

Despite these examples of independence, however, Peres often re1ied extensively on

others for consultation on issues and for assistance in decision-making. He was associated with

the knowledge elite, and worked extensively with scientists, university professors, and other

professionals (Keren 8). This connection to the intellectual community could reflect on Peres'

ability to recognize the value in others' contributions, as well as his own ability to admit when

he does not know the answer. By asking for input, Peres expands his options and increases the

number of problem-solving approaches at his disposal.

Peres' experience in the United States could also be the impetus for the success of his

economic partnership with the United States. When the Israeli economy was struggling, Peres

asked Reagan for assistance, and together the two countries devised a recovery plan. The time

Peres spent at Harvard could have potentia11y impacted this type of cooperation. For example,

connections Peres made through business leaders in the AMP session might have paved the way

for Peres' conversations with Reagan. Likewise, Peres might have learned how best to approach

Americans, not only through his class discussions, but also through the four month experience of
living and learning with a diverse group of American professionals.

Peres seems to be independent in some areas and consultative in others. These two

characteristics are not mutually exclusive, and may in fact reflect a high degree of autonomy and
an integrated ethnore1ativism. Peres was able to take a stance on issues, such as peace, about

which he is passionate, while also recognizing the benefits to seeking others' opinions. This

statement is qualified, however, for although Peres demonstrated an ability to gain insight from

those with different inte11ectual ski11s, that does not necessarily translate into a commitment to a
set of values when exposed to a wide variety of beliefs. It seems evident, however, that Peres

became more self-assured, for early in his political career Peres was only in leadership because

of a special relationship with another leader, such as Rabin or Ben-Gurion, but in the past decade
Peres has stood on his own (Salpeter 5).

The Models in Relation to the Leaders
The three cases suggest some possible links between foreign education and leadership,
but it is not yet clear the extent to which the two are linked, or the implications and possible
repercussions of that connection. It seems as though connections between the country of
education and the home country improve as a result of foreign education, for both Bhutto and
Peres sought out and improved relations between their countries and the United States, and
Robinson became active in the international arena. Additionally. of the three models presented
in the leadership, it seems as though Kauffmann and Bailey are more applicable to this type of
inquiry than is Hofstede, for the latter is more concerned with description of cultural differences,
whereas the fonner consider the implications of exposure to other value systems. Kauffinann's
model is useful as a tool for conceptualizing the potential changes which could occur within a
student studying abroad, but it does not provide any concrete methods for analyzing to what
extent a student progressed. Likewise, Bailey illustrates the potential dangers which could arise
from exposure to multiple cultures, for it gives a leader increased options not only for effective
leadership, but also for corrupt and self-servicing rule.
Hofstede is especially difficult to use in this type of study for it is impossible to
determine how an individual leader ranks within a cultural descriptor that refers to a society
comprised of millions of people. Further complications arise from the lack of any tools for
measuring, for example, how "weak" or "strong" a leader's uncertainty avoidance before he
went to Harvard as compared to once he was in power. Generally, it appears that Mary

Robinson might have become more individualistic as a result of her time in the United States,

Benazir Bhutto might have decreased her sense of power distance, at least in campaign rhetoric,
but remained loyal to her collective identity as a Bhutto, and Shimon Peres might have become

more willing to take risks in the economic and peace arenas. but Hofstede does not elaborate on

how one can interpret or measure individual change in any of those arenas.

Of the three leaders, it initially appears that Mary Robinson fits the Kauffmann model

most closely, by demonstrating a re-orientation towards social issues upon her return from

Harvard. She worked for peace,justice, and spoke out passionately about controversial issues,
whi1e also seeking to promote a sense of unity and Irish identity to which all with Irish blood

could relate. Benazir Bhutto seems to provide an example of what Bailey describes. Bhutto used

the language of democracy which she learned at Harvard ( and from her father) to gain support

and gain power. Once she was appointed prime minister, however, she reverted to the political
corruption for which Pakistani politics was known. She appointed her own supporters to high

offices, and her husband spent great quantities of the national budget for personal gain. Because
she had multiple value systems at her disposal, Bhutto used her ability to speak about human

rights issues and democracy in order to gain foreign support, while simultaneously promising the

anny noninterference in military matters.

Peres does not seem to fit any one category precisely, for he seems to have undergone a

major transformation, but it happened late in life. This could just be the result of the aging and

mellowing process as he suggested in his speech to the Richmond Forum. In addition,

Kauffmann did mention that most people do not make the transition to the third level of his

model until mid-life. Greater exploration of the models' relevance and accuracy in analyzing

"bridge leaders" must be undertaken, however, before anything conclusive could be said about

their validity, as well as before one could determine how exactly each of these three leaders
would be categorized according to the three models.

My Personal Opinion of the Leaders
Models aside, I personally believe that Mary Robinson seems to be a "bridge leader" for

she consistently worked for issues of social justice, and stood up for those whose opinions no

one listened to. This demonstrates a willingness to accept other cultural practices even though
one may not condone them. Robinson, for example, campaigned for the availability of

information about abortions even though she herself is Catholic and against the practice.

Robinson also actively encouraged dialogue among groups in Northern Ireland, inviting women
of different religions to the Republic of Ireland. As president, Robinson worked to create a

sense of!rish identity, and herself took lessons in Irish culture even while becoming an active

part of the European Community. For Mary Robinson, being Irish and being part of the United

Nations were both critical aspects of her identity. She can work for Irish cultural unity, or at
least an appreciation of the diversity in Ireland, while also working for international

understanding and partnership. Because of this, Mary Robinson, to me, seems to be a "bridge

leader," capable of bridging Ireland's culture and values with those of the global community.

I do not, however, feel Benazir Bhutto was a "bridge leader." My impression of Bhutto is

that her view of leadership, her value system, and her cultural practices were formed by her

family and her social standing. Bhutto was raised in a high socio-economic class, and led a

wealthy, privileged life. She never truly became an American coJlege student, although her

social habits may have changed somewhat while at Harvard. If anything, Bhutto became more
fiercely nationalistic while at Harvard because she was alone in defending her country and her

father at a time when the university community was critical of Pakistan's actions. In addition,

Bhutto's time at Harvard is minimal in comparison to her time at Oxford, in detention, and in

exile, a11 of which occurred after her 1973 graduation. Her undergraduate career, therefore,

should not be the primary consideration when evaluating the impact of major life experiences on
her perfonnance as prime minister. In addition, Bhutto was not an effective leader. nor was she
as popular at home as she was abroad. Although she was popular and successful when
campaigning, she was unproductive and unpopular in power. There is little in Bhutto's

leadership which seems to reflect anything she learned in the United States, except the ability to

present herself favorably to the Western countries. The only examples of her combining the two
cultures is her use of "feudal politics" when assigning judicial posts to PPP members, and her
ability to conduct tribal court while speaking and understanding the language of the West.
While this might count as being a "bridge leader" if one subscribes to Bailey's view that

leadership is the exploitation of values, Benazir Bhutto's failure to rea11y accomplish anything
productive during her time in power demonstrated to me a lack ofleadership ability, and

therefore disqualifies her from consideration.

I cannot decide whether or not I believe Peres is a "bridge leader." In regard to his

ability to develop a partnership with intellectuals, with the United States, and with the

Palestinians, Peres seems to be open to multiple points of view, and interested in cross-cultural

dialogue. The first two characteristics could be related to his time at Harvard, for there he was

encouraged to develop his critical thinking and analytical skills in relation to business problems.

Harvard also provided Peres with numerous contacts in the United States which might have been
useful later in his political career. His work for peace, however, does not necessarily stem from
his experience at Harvar� since the AMP session gave him connections to the United States

armed forces and businessmen, groups which are usually conservative, rather than exposure to
the liberal, questioning atmosphere which Robinson encountered. In addition, it was not until

late in his career that Peres became more open to the Arab perspective. For example, the 1978
document negotiated by Sadat and Peres in Vienna contained harsher terms for the Egyptians

than did the Camp David Accord negotiated later by Sadat and Rabin.

Peres' earlier work towards peace merely focused on stability and an end to conflict, and

it was not until recently that his focus seemed to be on the creation of actual peace and

partnership between Arabs and Israelis. In addition, since his transition from a "hawk" did not

occur until the 1980s, 30 years after his participation in the AMP session at Harvard, it is

extremely difficult to determine the reason for Peres' shift. My hesitation in stating an opinion

regarding Peres' qualification as a "bridge leader" hangs on the uncertainty of whether his
foreign experience had any relation to his commitment to peace, for I have not seen any

convincing evidence to relate the two. The only connection between Peres' vision of a New

Middle East and his experience in the United States, is that during his Forum Speech he extolled

both the democracy and the economic system of the United States. While further investigation
and research might lead to more conclusive evidence either way, in my opinion the jury is still

out on whether or not Peres is a "bridge leader."

Questions for Further Study
Comparing and contrasting the impact of foreign education on the three cases leads to

many questions which need to be explored in greater depth. One of these questions concerns the
leader's length of stay in the host country, and whether a culture's influence on leadership is in

some way proportional to the duration of exposure to that culture. It is interesting that the one

leader who spent the greatest amount of time overseas, Benazir Bhutto, demonstrates the greatest
amount of conflict and controversy in her leadership. She was dismissed twice after relatively
short periods of leadership. Her reputation has been tarnished by a series of weighty com.iption
allegations, and her tenn in office failed to accomplish many of the goals which she had listed
during her campaign.
Another factor that deserves further study is the impact of family legacy and socio
economic class on leadership style. Benazir Bhutto was the only leader among the three born
into a politically active and politically powerful family. Her wealthy landlord ancestors had
been in Sindh for centuries and had likewise been intimately involved in the affairs of the region
for years. Robinson, although from a wealthy family and described as a ..bluestocking," did not
have the same political heritage as Benazir, and had to campaign vigorously to win a seat in the
Dail and later to be elected president. Peres was the son of poor Polish settlers of Palestine who
worked in kibbutzim and eventua1ly became active in the Israeli defense ministry. Perhaps the
different ways in which the three were raised affected their leadership as much if not more so
than their classes at Harvard. After all. one's first framework for interpreting the world comes
from the lessons of childhood, and from the way in which parents, or parental figures, explain
the mysteries of life.
The socio-political contexts of both the country of education and the home country at the
time of foreign study also seem to play a role in the extent to which study abroad affects one's
]eadership and one's perspective on the world. The Vietnam protests, the Women's Liberation
movement, and the Civil Rights movement were all in various stages of deve]opment during the
time Robinson and Bhutto were at Harvard. This created an environment of protest, radicalism,
activism, and intense questioning which had varying effects on the two women. Part of the

reason for the disparate reactions was the different situation simultaneously occurring in their
home countries. While Ireland remained stable during the year Robinson was at Law Schoo],
Pakistan experienced major trauma during Bhutto's years at Radcliffe. Not only did East
Pakistan (Bangladesh) separate from West Pakistan, but India became involved in the conflict.
The result was humiliation and confusion in Bhutto's homeland, a circumstance which disturbed
her greatly. It may be possible that because much of Bhutto's attention was focused on events
occurring at home during her stay at Harvard, she was more defensive of her country and it's
perspective on issues and therefore was less open to dramatic change. In addition, the women
Bhutto lived with in Eliot House "were by and large a conservative group... [who] were living
after, but not in, the revolution" (Starr 419). Since she was not surrounded by radical feminists,
Bhutto's stance on women's issues was not likely to change as dramatically as it might have
otherwise.
In addition to these potential influences, there remain many others, such as time in exile
or in prison which might affect one's ability to lead a diverse group of people or the ability to see
multiple options when problem-solving or discussing an issue. Further research needs to be done
on the extent to which each of these variables affects leadership, as wen as the extent to which
the classes one takes while abroad affect one's perception of the host culture. Personal
discussion with the individual leaders would help one determine the actual impact of a foreign
experience on one's leadership, for the researcher could ask questions directly, rather than
construct implied answers from inherently biased secondary sources.
One final series of remaining questions involves the conceptualization of a "bridge
leader" and an understanding of national or ethnic culture. What exactly constitutes a good
mixture between traditional national or ethnic identity and a global identity? How does one

detennine which elements from each culture are best suited for the leadership context? In
addition, what type ofleadership is most effective in today's increasingly global society where
the opposing tensions of Jihad and McWorld come into play daily? Is the world becoming
oriented towards the Western model of free market democracy? Are Western values best suited
for solving modem day problems and cultural disputes, or is society calling for a return to
traditional constructions of identity? In addition, is it possible for an outside researcher to
evaluate, or even notice, a leadership style that uniquely combines two cultural views or value
systems into a distinctive new approach if one is not familiar with the norms and assumptions of
the two ..parent" cultures? What are the best methods for determining effectiveness and the
ability to bridge two cultures?
In conjunction with these questions, further investigation also needs to be done regarding
the best means for learning about another culture and for assimilating foreign values into one's
own belief system. For example, classes and organizations in which a student participates will
affect the way in which they learn about and perceive the foreign culture. Since professors have
their biases, and since different organizations have different ideologies and structural
hierarchies, two students from the same country who attended the Harvard could take different
classes and join different organizations and leave the country with different interpretations of
what constitutes American culture. How reliable, then, are our own perceptions of foreign
cultures, and to what degree is our understanding of other beliefs limited by our personal
worldviews and value systems?
Although this initial study is by no means conclusive, it does seem to indicate some
possible trends in leaders who studied overseas and were thereby exposed to a forei gn culture. It
suggests that as a result of an international experience, leaders can undergo a transformation in

which their worldview, values, and career objectives change significantly. This transformation,
depending on the individual, can occur almost instantaneously, or it can happen gradually over a
series of years. All individuals who study abroad do not necessarily undergo this change,
however. If individuals maintain especially close ties with their family and home country while
they are abroad, they probably wi11 not have as life-changing an experience in terms of
worldview, values, and career orientation as one who separates himself from his circle of close
family and friends. The cases also seem to indicate that issues occurring both at home and in the
host country affect the degree to which an individual feels liberated to experiment with identity
and with ideology. If for some reason one's country is under attack by the host country, an
individual may adhere more strongly than usual to the typical values and perspectives of his
country out of a feeling of self-defense and patriotism. Likewise, if the host country is
undergoing a rigorous self-examination and critique of societal values, an exchange student is
more likely to participate in the examination of his or her own society's values in addition to
those of the host culture.
Further research and investigation of more leaders must be done in order to make any
conclusive statements, but these three leaders all have something unique about their leadership,
whether it is their dramatic change from war hawk to peace activist, or that they were the first
woman to lead a Muslim country. Although it is impossible to determine whether this
uniqueness was due to their family, their own political context, some set of personal
characteristics, or education, by accumulating more data, one can begin to rule out options and
see the common threads.

Appendix 1: Hofstede's Dimensions for the United States, Ireland, Pakistan, and Israel

Country

United States
Ireland
Pakistan
Israel

Power distance Uncertainty Avoidance

small-medium
small
medium-high
verv small

moderatelv weak
weak
moderately sttong
strong

Individualism

very individual
moderately indiv
verv collective
middle

Masculinity

masculine
masculine
exact middle
low feminine

Power Distance- indicates the extent to which a society accepts the fact that power in
institutions and organizations is distributed unequally.

Uncertainty Avoidance• indicates the extent to which a society feels threatened by uncenain and
ambiguous situation and tries to avoid these situations by providing greater career
stability, establishing more fonnal rules, not tolerating deviant ideas and behaviors,
and believing in absolute truths and the attainment of expenise.

Jndividua/i.r,;m-Collectivism- individualism imolies a looselv knit social framework in which
people are supposed to take care of themselves and of their families only, while
collectivism is characterized by a tight social framework in which people distinguish
between in-groups and out•groups.

Masculinity- measurements in terms of this dimension express the extent to which the dominant
values in society are "masculine"-that is, assertiveness. the acquisition of money and
things, and not caring for others, the quality of life, or people.

Appendix 2: Kauffmann Model for Transformation Process

autonomv
Level l :OtherDependent
Level 2: InnerIJ,e�nd�nt.
Level 3: InterDependent

belong-ingConventional
Diffuse
Self-Selected
Group
Open

values

Inherited
Searching
Owned

coonition/vocation worldview
Encapsulated
Dualistic
Ethnocentrism
Empathetic
Relativistic
Ethnorelativism
Integrated
Commitment in
Ethnorelativism
Relativism

autonomy-refers to the way one person relates to another
other-dependency- sense of the world resides in an assumed authority outside the self
inner-dependency-begin to value authority of self as well as other sources of authority
inter-dependency-trust centered in the meeting of self and other and in recognizing the
strength in each (Kauffmann 128-9)
belonging-deals with network of relationships
conventional-conforms to class norms and interests of group born into
self-selected group-expansion of previously held boundaries of family, includes ..those of
like mind''
open-an alliance with those that are truly other than oneself.-those that see the world
different1y
values

inherited-political, religious preferences reflect those of parents or other authority figure
searching- any belief, no matter how sacred, up for evaluation
owned-committed to values uniquely their own

cognition-refers to intellectual development
dualistic-clear delineations between right and wrong based on authority of external group
or person
relativism-recognize that knowledge is contextual and relative, different perspectives are
pieces that fit into a whole
commitment in relativit;m-mak.e a self-conscious choice for one's way of knowing, affirm
responsibilities within pluralistic world
worldview-major unifying perception of"what is and how it is" (Kauffinannl40)
encapsulated-local seen as universal, relative as absolute, complex as simple
ethnore/ativism-difference no longer seen as threatenin& empathy for other beliefs
integrated ethnorelativism-allows ethical choice and action in the profoundly relativistic
world
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